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Weather, climate and total factor productivity
 
 
 
Abstract: Recently it has been hypothesized that climate change will affect total 
factor productivity growth. Given the importance of TFP for long-run economic 
growth, if true this would entail a substantial upward revision of current impact 
estimates. Using macro TFP data from a recently developed dataset in the Penn 
World Table, we test this hypothesis by directly examining the nature of the 
relationship between annual temperature shocks and TFP growth rates in the 
period 1960-2006. The results show a negative relationship only exists in poor 
countries, where a 1°C annual increase in temperature decreases TFP growth 
rates by about 1.1-1.8 percentage points, whereas the impact is 
indistinguishable from zero in rich countries. Extrapolating from weather to 
climate, the possibility of dynamic effects of climate change in poor countries 
increases concerns over the distributional issues of future impacts and, from a 
policy perspective, restates the case for complementarity between climate policy 
and poverty reduction. 
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Introduction 
 
Since the path-breaking work of Nordhaus (1991), economists have argued in 
favour of a modest carbon tax. A Pigou tax is justified if it is more likely than 
not that climate change has a net negative impact on present welfare. Although 
frequently challenged in favour of more stringent climate policy, estimates of 
the social cost of carbon have not increased over the years (Tol, 2018). Three 
independent author teams (Moore & Diaz, 2015; Dietz & Stern 2015; Moyer, 
Woolley, Matteson, Glotter & Weisbach, 2014) have recently hypothesized that, 
should climate change negatively affect total factor productivity, then the 
estimate of the Pigou tax increases drastically. In this paper, we present 
econometric evidence of the impact of weather and climate on total factor 
productivity growth. While not disputing the sign of the hypothesized effect, we 
show the average effect size is small. 
 
Most impact studies of climate change have taken the form of comparative 
statics impact estimates. These studies show that climate change would have a 
modest negative impact of human welfare, i.e., a few percent over a century 
(Tol, 2018), but they have been criticized because they could not fully capture 
the potential damage by future climate change (Pindyck, 2012 & 2013; Stern, 
2013; Weitzman, 2009 & 2011). 
 
Besides static impacts on welfare, there are also dynamic ones: climate change 
affects the growth rate of the economy (Fankhauser & Tol, 2005; Hallegatte, 
2005). The distinction between static, or “level” effects, and dynamic, or 
“growth” effects of climate change on economic activity is of first order 
importance in terms of the magnitude of future impacts. While the so-called 
level effects are temporary and intrinsically reversible, growth effects 
compound over time and permanently reduce output. An impact of hot 
temperatures on a given year’s agricultural yields would represent a level effect, 
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while an impact on investments or institutions would affect the economy’s 
ability to grow, altering its future path. Fankhauser and Tol (2005) argue that 
climate change may affect labour supply, capital depreciation and productivity 
(rather than productivity growth). They find that, if these effects are negative, 
economic growth would be suppressed. The resulting welfare loss would be 
similar in size to the estimates of the static welfare losses. 
 
Since the onset of growth economics and the pioneering Solow model (Solow, 
1956) TFP has been considered a key element to explain long-run development. 
TFP, as is widely known, represents a combination of labour and capital 
productivity, which accounts for increase in total output not due to labour or 
capital inputs, and traditionally has been seen as a rough measure of 
technological progress. Recently, a number of theoretical studies have 
hypothesized a future impact of global warming on TFP growth (Stern, 2013; 
Moore & Diaz, 2015; Dietz & Stern 2015; Moyer, Woolley, Matteson, Glotter 
& Weisbach, 2014). Given the preeminent importance of TFP for long-run 
economic growth, if climate change will really harm TFP growth rates, this 
would entail a radical revision of impact estimates. 
 
Dietz and Stern (2015) change the workings of DICE, one of the most used 
Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs), to allow climate impacts to affect TFP 
growth.1 They find a much stronger case for stringent emission abatement. 
Similarly, Moyer, Woolley, Matteson, Glotter and Weisbach (2014) argue that 
the IAMs used by the US federal Interagency Working Group (IWG)2 on the 
Social Cost of Carbon may not capture the full range of consequences of climate 
change, and contest the fact that “(IAMs) implicitly assume that society will 
grow far wealthier in the future even if temperatures increase by amounts that 
                                                 
1 Further changes to the DICE framework they undertake are allowing for convexity of the 
damage function (Weitzman, 2010) and for high values of the climate sensitivity parameter 
(Weitzman, 2009 & 2011). 
2 DICE (Nordhaus, 2008), FUND (Anthoff, Tol, & Yohe, 2009) and PAGE (Hope, 2006). 
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many scientists believe may cause substantial hardships”. Consequently they 
change DICE and allow climate impacts to directly affect TFP growth, finding, 
consistently with Dietz and Stern (2015) large effects on future growth and a 
much higher value of the Social Cost of Carbon (SCC) than the IWG one3. 
 
However, these works do not provide any empirical evidence for this claim and 
the consequent simulations (Tol, 2018). In fact, while these calibrated models 
are very sensitive to assumptions about the impact of climate change on TFP 
growth, the assumptions are just that: they are not grounded in observations. 
The current paper estimates the impact of weather variability and climate 
change on total factor productivity growth.  
 
There is a large and growing body of empirical literature which focuses on the 
relationship between climate and economic activity. Jared Diamond (Diamond, 
1999) revived the spirit of Ellsworth Huntington (Huntington, 1922), arguing 
that geography and climate are the fundamental drivers of economic 
development. Olsson and Hibbs (2005) provide empirical support. Gallup, 
Sachs, and Mellinger (1999) argue that geography and climate are important, 
but that their impact can be modified by technology. In sharp contrast to this 
environmental determinism, (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2000; Easterly 
& Levine, 2003; Rodrik, Subramanian, & Trebbi, 2004) argue for institutional 
determinism and find that, in a direct statistical contest, institutional variables 
have predictive power but climate and geography variables do not. The 
institutional view has been challenged by Alsan (2014) and Andersen, Dalgaard 
and Selaya (2016). Alsan (2014) shows that the tse-tse fly is a major factor in 
the underdevelopment in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Andersen, Dalgaard and Selaya 
(2016) show that UV radiation (but not climate) plays a role in explaining the 
                                                 
3 Also, they notice how impacts on growth would contribute to settle the debate on the discount 
rate sparked after the publication of the Stern Review (Stern, 2007). See also Nordhaus (2007), 
Stern (2013) and Tol et al. (2006). 
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pattern of development across the world. 
These cross-section analyses of the climate-income relationship suffer from a 
range of endogeneity and confounders problems. A literature has emerged that 
uses robust panel studies that try to isolate the effect of temperature or other 
meteorological variables on economic activity and growth.4 A comprehensive 
review is carried out in Dell, Jones, and Olken (2014). 
 
As far as climate change is concerned, though, this literature is problematic for 
a number of reasons. First, as emphasized by Tol (2018), weather impacts are 
assumed to be informative about climate impacts; put differently, short-term 
elasticities are used to assess long-term effects. Second, since the Industrial 
Revolution global temperature has risen of almost 1°C (IPCC, 2013) while 
increases in temperature during the 21st century will very likely be of 2°C or 
more (IPCC, 2013) which means these studies extrapolate far beyond historical 
experience. Third, it is by no means guaranteed that historical relationships will 
continue to hold in the future as technologies and institutions evolve. However, 
while external validity is debatable, there are techniques, as for example long 
differences, that can alleviate these concerns. Thus, these caveats 
notwithstanding, recently panel methods have been employed to disentangle 
level effects from growth effects. 
 
For example, in a global sample from 1950-2003, Dell, Jones, and Olken (2012) 
find temperature shocks have significant negative effects on GDP growth of 
poor countries, but not of rich ones. Interestingly, using weather lags and long 
differences, they find evidence for persistence of impacts, which suggests 
temperature shocks are only slowly absorbed by the economy and have long-
lasting effects in poor countries, leading them to conclude that temperature also 
affects the growth rate of GDP in poor countries, other, or rather, than output 
                                                 
4As they explain: “panel data exploit the exogeneity of cross-time weather variation, allowing 
for causative identification”. 
6 
 
level. Bansal and Ochoa (2011) do not exploit country-specific temperature 
shocks, but global average temperature shocks, and find tropical countries are 
the most vulnerable and that on average a 1°C global increase reduces growth 
by 0.9%. A study on windstorms by Hsiang and Jina (2014) for 28 Caribbean 
countries over the 1970-2006 period shows similar results. Burke, Hsiang, and 
Miguel (2015), studying 166 countries between 1960 and 2010, find that 
productivity peaks at about 13°C and declines non-linearly thereafter, without 
significant heterogeneity between rich and poor countries, leading them to 
predict impacts much larger than previously estimated. More recently, Using 
detailed micro-data on Chinese firm production, Zhang et al. (2018) document 
an inverted-U shape relationship between temperature and TFP at the firm 
level.  
 
These studies focus on the recent past, which saw only limited climate change. 
This could, on the one hand, lead one to speculate that these impacts could be 
exacerbated by further increases or non-linear effects which lie outside 
historical experience and, on the other, that weather impacts must be interpreted 
with caution given both the difference between a 1°C shock in a given year and 
place and a permanent 1°C global increase, and the fact that in the long-run 
adaptation may take place and substantially mitigate negative impacts. It is the 
controversial but ultimately difficult to solve “intensification vs adaptation” 
debate over which of these two long-term effects will eventually outweigh the 
other (Dell, Jones & Olken, 2014).  
 
A first consequence of this new wave of empirical studies on climate and growth 
has been to induce practitioners to use these new estimates to derive 
empirically-based projections and implement them in IAMs to see how these 
respond to the relaxation of assumptions about exogenous economic growth. 
Moore and Diaz (2015) show that if DICE is modified and calibrated on Dell, 
Jones and Olken (2012), the predicted impacts go up, and so the consequent 
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SCC, compared to the baseline scenario in which climate change does not affect 
growth. Lemoine and Kapnick (2015) convert estimates of past economic costs 
of regional warming into projections of the economic costs of future global 
warming. They do recognize, though, that this is mostly relevant only for 
relatively small changes in climate. 
 
Using TFP data from the most recent version of the Penn World Table, we use 
a panel dataset for 60 countries, covering the period 1960 – 2006, to test the 
hypothesis of a causal relationship between temperature shocks and annual TFP 
growth rates. What emerges from our analysis is that temperature shocks affect 
annual TFP growth rates only in poor countries. This conclusion is subjected to 
caveats and must be interpreted with caution. Nonetheless, it basically confirms 
the results of Dell, Jones and Olken (2012) and rejects the conclusions of  Burke, 
Hsiang, and Miguel (2015). We also show that the assumptions of Dietz and 
Stern (2015), Moore and Diaz (2015) and Moyer, Woolley, Matteson, Glotter 
and Weisbach (2014) have no empirical grounding. 
 
The contributions of this paper are the following: first, it provides a useful 
empirical test for the plausibility of the recent hypothesis of an impact of climate 
change on TFP growth. Second, to our knowledge this is the first study to 
examine the macro relationship between temperature shocks and TFP growth. 
Third, unlike other previous works on temperature and economic growth, this 
analysis can provide direct, and not just indirect, evidence on the persistence of 
weather impacts on economic activity in the medium or long-run, since it 
focuses on TFP, and not GDP, growth rate. 
Fourth, we show the main reason behind the impact on TFP growth in poor 
countries is labour productivity, thus linking the existing macro literature with 
the recent micro studies on the relationship between temperature and human 
physiology. 
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The outline of the rest of this paper is as follows. Section 1 provides a theoretical 
background on the potential TFP-climate change relationship. Section 2 
presents data and descriptive statistics. Section 3 describes the identification 
strategy. Section 4 presents empirical results. Section 5 investigates the 
potential explanations for the heterogeneity of impacts detected in Section 4. 
Section 6 discusses the implications of the results with regard to climate change. 
Section 7 sums up, illustrates some caveats and concludes. 
 
Section 1 
 Background on the TFP impact channel 
 
We follow Dietz and Stern (2015) to show how climate change could affect 
technological progress.  
Consider the standard DICE model: a Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans growth model 
with an added climate externality and emission abatement costs: 
 
Yt   =  (1 - Ω𝑡
Y) (1 - Ʌt) [At Nt1-α Ktα]                                     (1) 
 
where  At  and  Nt  are specified exogenously, Kt  evolves according to the 
standard equation: 
 
Kt+1   =  Kt  (1-δ) + sYt                                                                                (2) 
 
Ʌt are emission abatement costs and  Ω𝑡
Y is a quadratic damage function of the 
change in global temperature relative to the global mean in 19005: 
 
Ω𝑡
Y
  = 1  –  
1
1+π1△T𝑡+π2△Tt
2                                           (3) 
                                                 
5 The damage function is usually calibrated ad hoc on the basis of impact studies of climate 
change. The quadratic form has been criticized because it does not allow for a steep increase of 
damages at higher temperatures (Stern, 2013; Weitzman, 2010). 
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Equation (1) represents the impact function in case of only level effects: in this 
model, a portion of output in each time period is simply “thrown away” due to 
the impacts of climate change  Ω𝑡
Y . 
 
In this framework, climate impacts affect long-run economic growth as climate 
change reduces current output, and hence savings and investment, which in turn 
reduce future capital and future output. The savings rate may also be affected, 
as the returns to investment fall. Both effects have been shown to be 
quantitatively small (Fankhauser & Tol, 2005; Moyer, Woolley, Matteson, 
Weisbach & Glotter, 2014). 
 
If, instead, climate change also affects TFP, things change substantially. 
Specifically, TFP is endogenous and grows according to the following law of 
motion: 
 
                            At + 1  =  (1 – Ω𝑡
A) (1 - 𝛿𝑡
A ) At   + α(It )                                            (4) 
 
where 𝛿𝑡
A  is the net depreciation rate for productivity, α(It ) is a “spillover 
function” that converts the flow of capital investment in each period into a flow 
of capital externalities, and  Ω𝑡
A  are the impacts of climate change on TFP, while 
the remaining share of damages still affects output level. 
Damages are then partitioned between output and TFP: 
 
                                 Ω𝑡
A  =  fA · Ω𝑡                                                               (5) 
 
                                 Ω𝑡
Y  =  1 –   
(1−Ω𝑡)
(1− Ω𝑡
A)
                                                           (6) 
 
where fA is the fraction of impacts of climate change that harms TFP growth. 
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The effects of this modification depend on the share of impacts directly 
affecting TFP, but even a small share leads to a radically different consumption 
growth path:  Dietz and Stern (2015) assume that fA  = 0.05 and find that 
consumption per capita in year 2205 is reduced from more than 15 times the 
2005 level to 11.4 times higher. Moyer, Woolley, Matteson, Glotter and 
Weisbach (2014) explore the consequences of different values of  fA between 
1% and 100%. They show that fA = 0.05 leads to a 70% drop in consumption 
per capita in 2300 relative to the no climate change case. Similar qualitative 
results are obtained by Moore and Diaz (2015) when they alter the DICE model 
to let climate change affect TFP growth on the basis of parameters calibrated on 
the estimates of  Dell, Jones and Olken (2012). As Dietz and Stern (2015) sum 
up: “in this formulation some part of the instantaneous impacts of climate 
change falls on TFP, permanently reducing future output possibilities”. 
 
Section 2 
Data and descriptive statistics 
 
A. Data 
 
Data for this paper are taken from a range of different sources. 
 
TFP Data 
 
Data on total factor productivity of countries come from the most recent version 
of the Penn World Table, PWT 8.1 (PWT 8.1, 2016). In particular, in our study 
we use RTFPNA data6, where RFTPNA stands for “Real Total Factor Productivity 
from National Accounts data”. RTFPNA is a country-specific index of TFP 
which, in the benchmark year, 2005, takes value 1 for all countries. RTFPNA can 
                                                 
6 Note that this series has only recently become available. Previous studies of the impact of 
climate change on economic growth, reviewed above, therefore did not have access to these 
data. 
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be used to study within-country productivity growth over time. In our 
specifications, we use the natural logarithm of the RTFPNA index. This means 
that the 2005 benchmark value is 0 for all countries in the logarithmic 
specification. We calculate annual RTFPNA growth rates by first-differencing, 
and check for stationarity7. Henceforth, from now on, “TFP growth rate” it is 
intended as the annual growth rate of the natural logarithm of the RTFPNA index 
as taken from PWT 8.1.  
These pre-estimated TFP growth data are calculated using the growth rate of 
real GDP from national accounts data, in conjunction with the growth rates of 
capital stock at constant national prices and of the labour force (Feenstra, Inklaar 
& Timmer, 2013). This is a standard process in TFP estimation as a residual of 
a combination of labour and capital. TFP obviously depends on the estimate of 
the other components. As any measure of TFP, these PWT data are not immune 
from concerns about measurement error; this issue will be addressed below. For 
further information on the RTFPNA index and data, see Web Appendix (1). 
 
Temperature and Precipitation Data 
 
These data are taken from the Terrestrial Air Temperature and Precipitation: 
1900 – 2006 Monthly Time Series (Matsuura & Willmott, 2007), from the 
University of Delaware (UDEL), as aggregated to the country-year level by 
(Dell, Jones & Olken, 2012), using population weights, where the weights are 
constructed from 1990 population data at 30 arc second resolution from the 
Global Rural Urban Mapping Project (Balk et al., 2004). Importantly, given 
temperature levels are trend-stationary, in order to exclude potentially spurious 
results and ensure stationary residuals in our regressions, we transform data by 
first-differencing and check for stationarity. We do the same with precipitation 
data. 
 
                                                 
7 For the panel unit root tests for annual TFP growth, temperature change and precipitation 
change, see Web Appendix (2), Tables A.1 – A.6. 
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GDP Data 
 
We use per capita GDP data to distinguish between impacts in rich and poor 
countries. These data come from the Maddison Project (‘Maddison Project’, 
2016.).  
 
B. Descriptive Statistics 
 
The main dataset is composed of 60 countries8 and covers the period 1960 – 
2006. Figure 1 is a scatterplot of TFP and temperature levels in 2006, and the 
linear prediction.  As can be seen, there is a negative correlation between the 
two. This correlation is not a causal relationship, but could be due to 
confounding factors such as institutions. There is no reverse causality. 
Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics for the main variables. There is a 
huge variation both in the annual growth rates of TFP, with an average of about 
5% annual increase but a minimum and a maximum that are respectively -56% 
and 27%, and in terms of temperature changes as well, where the mean annual 
change in temperature is very small but the extremes are between 2°C and 3°C.  
Finally, precipitation exhibits even greater variability. 
 
Section 3 
Empirical strategy 
 
We use a fixed-effect panel as the estimation method to isolate the impact of 
weather shocks on the growth rate of total factor productivity 9 . Our 
identification strategy is straightforward and follows Dell, Jones, and Olken 
(2012). The baseline specification of our model is the following: 
 
                  𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽∆𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾∆𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜃𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                (7) 
                                                 
8 The choice of the countries has been made on the basis of data availability. For the list of 
countries, see Web Appendix (4). 
9 For the appropriateness of the FE approach compared to a random effects (RE) specification, 
see Web Appendix (2), Table A.7. 
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Where 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡  represents the annual growth rate of TFP, and  ∆𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡  is annual 
temperature change. Δ𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 represents annual change in precipitation levels, 
which is used only as a control variable following the recommendation in 
Auffhammer, Hsiang, Schlenker  and Sobel (2013). By excluding precipitation, 
we would run the risk of omitted variable bias. Furthermore, in order to 
investigate for heterogeneous effects of temperature shocks, we follow Dell, 
Jones and Olken (2014) and interact the vector of temperature changes with 
dummies that capture the heterogeneity of interest, in particular dummies for 
being a “poor” or a “hot” country. 
 
One may be worried that rainfall is the only observed control variable in our 
specification. However, since many traditional control variables are themselves 
affected by climate, adding more time-varying observables which are 
endogenous to the weather variation could actually be counterproductive and 
partially offset part of the true weather effect. This is the so-called over-
controlling problem  (Dell, Jones & Olken, 2014) or ‘bad control’ (Burke, 
Hsiang and Miguel, 2015), a well-known issue in climate literature, which calls 
for caution and recommends to include only plausibly exogenous covariates. 
 
As for the other elements in the equation, 𝜇𝑖 are country fixed effects, 𝜃𝑟𝑡 are 
region x time fixed effects, where this interaction allows for differentiated 
trends in different regions, as suggested by Dell, Jones and Olken (2014), in 
order to isolate idiosyncratic local shocks10. Finally, 𝜀𝑖𝑡 are error terms adjusted 
for clustering at the country level. 
 
Reverse causality is a minor worry. Confounding variables, instead, could be a 
cause of concern. TFP is constructed rather than observed. If weather variations 
                                                 
10 For the list of regions, see Web Appendix (5). 
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would cause mismeasurement in the size of the labour force or the capital stock, 
then we would wrongly attribute this to TFP. For instance, weather variations 
could lead to short-term reallocation of workers across industries or sectors, or 
short-term unemployment, that could be imperfectly measured by annual data 
on the labour force. The measurement problem is more likely to occur in low-
income countries. As temperature shocks impact TFP only in low-income 
countries, this possible measurement problem would not be innocuous 11 . 
However, we are not aware of a way to test this for our data. 
 
TFP is total factor productivity. By construction, when measured at a national, 
annual resolution, TFP is a mix of a wide range of factors. Changes in TFP can 
be due to technological change, the standard but flawed interpretation. Changes 
in TFP can also be due to managerial or behavioural change, changes in the 
structure of the economy or company entry and exit within sectors, changes in 
regulation or taxation, changes in the provision of public goods, changes in 
market power, or changes in international trade. The results below show that 
temperature variations affect TFP growth, but our data do not allow us to 
precisely identify the channel through which TFP is affected. That said, our 
approach is a step forward compared to previous studies which looked at 
economic growth, an even more convoluted measure. 
 
Section 4 
Baseline results 
 
Table 2 reports the results for the baseline specification of equation (7). Column 
(1) only includes annual changes in temperature and precipitation levels. A first 
inspection shows that the coefficient for the annual change in temperatures, 
△Temp, is negative and significant at the 5% level, suggesting that a 1°C annual 
                                                 
11 See, e.g., Colmer (2017) on the link between weather changes and labour reallocation across 
sectors.   
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increase in temperature would lower TFP growth rates of countries by 0.49%. 
Column (2), however, reveals that adding an interaction between temperature 
change and a dummy for being poor – with “poor” being defined as having a 
below median GDP per capita in the initial year of our panel, 1960 12  – 
substantially changes the picture: this interaction in fact is negative and strongly 
significant, while the coefficient for temperature changes is now negative but 
statistically insignificant, which suggests the negative effects of temperature on 
TFP growth rates are concentrated in poor countries.  
 
This is confirmed by looking at the net impact of temperature change in poor 
countries, at the bottom of Column (2), which suggests a 1°C annual increase 
in temperature in poor countries would decrease TFP growth rates by about 1.5 
percentage points, with a significance at the 1% level. 
 
This finding is somewhat weakened when we add an interaction between 
temperature changes and a dummy for being hot, with “hot” being defined as 
having an above median average temperature in the 1960s. The results are 
shown in Column (3): the coefficient of the Poor x △Temp interaction is now -
1.2 %, and significant at 5%, while the “hot” interaction turns out to be 
insignificant, and so its net effect. Importantly, the total effect of temperature in 
poor countries is also diminished both in terms of magnitude and significance13. 
The fact that the negative effect of temperature changes in poor countries is 
somewhat weakened could be explained in two different ways: the first is that 
the negative effect of temperature on TFP growth rates comes not only through 
being poor, but also, partially, through being hot, and the second is that the 
                                                 
12 The cut-off point for GDP per capita is approximately 2684.33 international Geary - Khamis 
dollars (1990 benchmark year). 
13
 Incidentally, it is also worth remarking how precipitation change has a negative and 
significant effect, but this control variable has proved to be very sensitive to specifications 
throughout the entire empirical analysis and its results should therefore be interpreted with 
caution and are no further discussed here. 
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definitions of “hot” and “poor” overlap to a good extent and thus the inclusion 
of an “hot” interaction partially offsets the results for poor countries. The 
distinction matters a great deal when it comes to conclusions with regard to 
future climate change: it is a completely different picture whether the negative 
effects of temperature shocks appear only in poor countries or also, even if 
slightly, in hot countries regardless whether rich or poor. 
 
In order to shed light on the issue, in Column (4) we use an alternative definition 
of poor, with “poor” being now defined as having a below median GDP per 
capita, where median GDP per capita is now calculated over the whole 1960 – 
2006 period and not just in 1960 as above14. The “poor” interaction is again 
strongly significant, with the coefficient of Poor_2 x △Temp again very similar, 
with a value of -1.43 percentage points, the “hot” interaction again negative but 
statistically insignificant (and so its net total impact), and the total impact in 
poor countries again significant at the 1% level. Therefore, this variation 
suggests that only TFP growth rates of poor countries are affected by 
temperature shocks. 
 
Finally, to enhance confidence in this finding, in Column (5) and (6) we 
consider a different definition of “hot” country, with the dummy for hot that has 
value 1 for countries with an average temperature in the 1960s above the 75% 
percentile, and repeat our specifications.  The results, while confirming the 
negative impact of temperature shocks on the TFP growth rate of poor countries, 
also show that there is a negative and 5% significant impact of temperature 
shocks in hot countries, with a net effect of about -1 percentage point on the 
annual TFP growth. In other words, even though the negative effect of annual 
temperature comes through being poor, there also seems to be weak evidence 
of an impact in hot countries.  
                                                 
14 In this case the cut-off point for GDP per capita is approximately 4417.1 international Geary 
- Khamis dollars (1990 benchmark year). 
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Given the importance of this distinction in terms of policy guidelines on climate 
change, we conduct a variety of sensitivity tests to ensure the robustness of our 
results. In particular, the following robustness checks are performed: the 
repetition of the baseline specification for a different dataset, comprising 68 
countries and covering the period 1970–2006; a specification including an 
interaction between temperature shocks and a dummy for being rich; an 
investigation of the poor subsample of our dataset; a specification using a joint 
interaction term for countries which are both poor and hot; a different 
classification between poor and rich countries; regressions on changes in the 
number of persons employed and capital stock; the use of Driscoll-Kraay (1998) 
standard errors in place of clustered standard errors for the baseline analysis in 
both samples; an investigation of persistence of temperature effects through the 
inclusion of lags in the regressions; five different sensitivity tests to check for 
robustness with respect to climatic data and functional forms of the weather 
variables. These robustness checks are presented and discussed in the online 
appendix15. Our key finding, i.e. the pattern of heterogeneity of impacts between 
rich and poor countries, is never contradicted. 
 
Section 5 
Heterogeneity in the impacts of temperature shocks 
 
Having established robustness of our results, we now move to a more in-depth 
analysis of the heterogeneity of impacts.  
Such heterogeneous pattern could be due to intrinsic differences, between rich 
and poor countries, in climate, levels of development, quality of institutions and 
composition of TFP. Below we discuss and test for each of these factors. 
 
A. Differences in climate and non-linearity of temperature impacts 
 
                                                 
15 See Web Appendix (3). 
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One might object that the reason for the heterogeneity in the impacts of 
temperature shocks between is that we fail to account for non-linearity of 
temperature effects, i.e. the exogenous difference in climatic conditions 
between rich and poor countries. Indeed, this is what Burke, Miguel and Hsiang 
(2015) results suggest: “with most poor countries on the downward slope of the 
response function [between the temperature level and the GDP growth rate] but 
rich countries distributed almost symmetrically around the optimum, a linear 
regression for the effect of temperature would recover a steep negative in poor 
countries but ambiguous (and closer to zero) slope for rich countries”16. 
To take this relevant possibility into account, we perform two separate tests. In 
Table 3 we present a different specification in which we include the square of 
annual temperature change as an additional independent variable in the 
regressions, and we also interact it with the “poor” and “hot” dummies like we 
do for annual temperature change in the main specification. As Columns (1) – 
(6) show, the square of annual temperature change is almost always 
insignificant, even in poor countries. The total weather impacts are slightly 
bigger. 
In Table 4 we opt for a different specification to capture potential non-linearity. 
First, we follow the test recommended by Bigano, Hamilton and Tol (2006) and  
Burke, Miguel and Hsiang (2015): in Column (1) we include only an interaction 
between annual temperature change and average temperature. ∆Temp has a 
positive and strongly significant impact but the interaction with average 
temperature is negative and strongly significant. This suggests that the impact 
of hot weather is positive in cool countries and negative in warm countries. 
However, when we also include an interaction between temperature change and 
average GDP per capita in Column (2), the picture is different: now temperature 
shocks have a negative and significant impact, while the interaction with GDP 
per capita is positive and significant. While the interaction with average 
                                                 
16 Supplementary Information, page 20. 
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temperature is still negative and significant (although almost halved in 
magnitude), the sign change of the coefficient of temperature shocks reveals 
that the temperature response is being driven by average income, rather than by 
average temperature. The significant, negative interaction with average 
temperature suggests that hotter countries suffer from bigger impacts, but 
because of the high correlation between heat and wealth it is difficult to separate 
the two effects.  
Finally, in Columns (3) and (4) we explore in further detail the possibility of 
differential responses due to heat and affluence. In Column (3) we interact 
temperature shocks with dummies capturing average temperature quartiles, i.e. 
we group countries in 4 categories: cold, mild, warm and hot. This specification 
with temperature bins is relatively non-parametric and can further shed light on 
potential non-linearity. The results in Column (3) confirm the presence of non-
linear dynamics: the impact of temperature shocks is positive and significant for 
cold countries and negative and significant for mild, warm and hot countries. 
However, when we add the respective interactions with average GDP per capita 
(Column (4)), the signs of the coefficients for temperature shocks are negative 
for all the groups, and significant only for mild and hot countries, whereas the 
interaction with average GDP per capita is always positive, and weakly 
significant for mild and hot countries. The qualitative insight is that there is no 
differential response due to heat, and that the relationship between TFP growth 
and temperature shocks is mediated by income. 
 
On the whole, these tests suggest that there is no evidence of meaningful non-
linear effects of temperature shocks, and that a linear function is the best 
approximation of the TFP-temperature relationship for this dataset, in line with 
Dell, Jones & Olken (2012). We also confirm their finding that countries at 
different levels of development respond differently to weather shocks. 
Therefore, heterogenous climates in rich and poor countries do not account for 
the heterogenous impacts. 
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B. Differences in development and / or institutions                                                                                                      
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Are poor countries vulnerable to temperature shocks because of the existence 
of a development and/or institutional gap compared to rich countries? 
To answer this question, we investigate two specifications which could affect 
the interpretation and validity of our findings. First, we run a specification in 
which we substitute the “poor” interaction with an interaction between 
temperature shocks and GDP per capita. The previous definitions of poor, in 
fact, are all based on a fixed classification between who is rich and who is poor. 
This is fine for estimation, but not for simulation. In almost fifty years countries 
that were poor in the beginning grew out of poverty, with the notable examples 
of South Korea, Malaysia and China. We would hope for other countries to 
follow their lead in the next fifty years. Interacting annual temperature changes 
with GDP per capita can overcome this, and provide evidence on whether the 
negative impact of temperature shocks on the growth rate of TFP gets smaller 
or disappears as countries grow richer. 
 
As Column (1) in Table 5 shows, this is the case. The interaction with GDP per 
capita is positive and significant at the 1% level: solving the first derivative with 
respect to △Temp, and re-transforming the natural logarithm of GDP in dollars, 
suggests that the marginal effect of a 1°C annual increase becomes zero when 
income is approximately $34,400 per person per year for countries classified as 
“hot”17, approximately $14,900 per person per year for countries not classified 
as “hot”18, and approximately $25,600 per person per year for the sample as a 
whole19 (see Figures 2, 3 and 4 for a graphical representation of the marginal 
effects, at different GDP per capita levels, for the three cases).  
                                                 
17 In natural logarithm: 10.447 (SE = 1.234). 
18 In natural logarithm: 9.609 (SE = 0.351). 
19 In natural logarithm: 10.150 (SE = 0.283). 
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This indicates that, even though the estimates are inevitably imprecise, and the 
GDP level where the marginal effect of △Temp turns zero depends on the initial 
temperature level, development always means reduced vulnerability and, 
ultimately, immunity from the impact of temperature shocks on TFP growth 
rate. 
 
The second alternative specification includes an interaction between 
temperature changes and a measure of institutional quality, Polity 2  (‘Polity IV 
Project', 2014). We added this interaction because it could be the case that 
negative impacts come not through being a poor country, but through poor 
institutions, i.e. through low institutional quality. In the context of the well-
known debate on the determinants of long-run development (Acemoglu, Jonson 
& Robinson, 2000; Diamond, 1999; Easterly & Levine, 2003; Gallup, Sachs, & 
Mellinger, 1999), the institution hypothesis is one of the two main currents (the 
other being the geography hypothesis). Institutions are considered by many 
(Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, 2000; Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, 2001; 
Easterly and Levine, 2003; Rodrik, Subramanian & Trebbi, 2004) as the 
fundamental cause of economic growth in the long-run. This specification thus 
constitutes a way of testing once again the relationship between climate, 
institutions and development. 
 
We use Polity 2 as a measure of institutions. Polity 2 ranges from -10 to 10 and 
combines the democracy and autocracy scores from the Polity IV dataset. In 
order to investigate whether or not the impact of temperature appears also, or 
exclusively, through the institutional channel, we interact it with annual 
temperature changes and add this interaction to the baseline specification with 
the “poor” interaction.  
 
Column (2) in Table 5 shows our finding is not altered: the negative impact of 
temperature still appears through being poor, and the coefficient for the total 
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effect in poor countries is analogous both in significance and magnitude to the 
previous ones. There is some weak evidence that the interaction between 
temperature shocks and Polity 2 has a positive effect on the TFP growth rate, 
but this is not enough to justify a rethinking of our main conclusion. 
 
C. Differences in the composition of TFP   
                                                                                                    
We find a negative effect of weather shocks on total factor productivity growth, 
but only in poor countries. Results from the previous section suggest the reason 
for this pattern is the development, rather than institutional, gap between rich 
and poor countries. Such gap must also entail heterogeneity in the composition 
of TFP which makes TFP growth vulnerable to temperature shocks only in poor 
countries. This is probably due to the fact that poor countries have a much larger 
share of their GDP in the agricultural sector, much more outdoor work and 
lower adaptive capacity, which suggests that one of the channels could be an 
impact on (outdoor) labour productivity. 
 
Labour productivity is one of the components of total factor productivity. We 
use labour productivity growth in place of TFP growth as an alternative 
dependent variable for two reasons: first, it represents an additional and useful 
to check the robustness for our core findings; and second, it could provide 
insights on the channels through which temperature affects TFP growth and on 
the reasons why this is only the case for poor countries. Hence, we repeat our 
basic specification, replacing annual TFP growth with annual labour 
productivity growth, where labour productivity is defined as annual output per 
person employed. Data on labour productivity have been obtained by Penn 
World Table, PWT 8.1 (PWT 8.1, 2016), by dividing real GDP at constant 
national prices by the annual number of persons employed. 
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Table 6 shows the results for the baseline sample20: the impact of temperature 
shocks on labour productivity growth is negative and significant only in poor 
countries, and the coefficients are remarkably consistent and very similar in 
magnitude and significance to those of the TFP regressions, which suggests, as 
discussed in further detail in Section 6, that this is indeed a key channel 
responsible for the temperature-TFP relationship in poor countries. This has 
also been shown in studies of microdata (Cachon, Gallino, & Olivares, 2012; 
Heal & Park, 2015; Niemelä, Hannula, Rautio, Reijula, & Railio, 2002; 
Sudarshan & Tewari, 2013). 
 
In sum, the pattern of heterogeneity in impacts is due to the differences in levels 
of development – including institutional quality, access to markets, capital and 
technology, health care and education – and in the composition of total factor 
productivity, which make poor countries more vulnerable to temperature shocks 
compared to rich ones. 
 
Section 6 
Implications of climate change 
 
What do these results mean for future climate change? The temperature in poor 
countries in the almost half century of our sample saw an increase of 
approximately 0.6°C, or on average 0.012°C per year. There were positive and 
negative shocks to the annual temperature but the positive shocks were, on 
average, 0.012°C larger. This means that, on average, negative shocks to the 
annual TFP growth rate were 0.012°C/year * 1.523 (cf. Table 2, Column (2)) = 
0.018% (SE = 0.005 %) per year larger than positive shocks.  
The 21st century could see an additional global warming of 0.3-4.8°C21 (IPCC 
2013). To make projections on the impacts of future climate change, we 
                                                 
20 Cf. Table A.24 in Web Appendix (3) for the alternative sample. 
21 Given that the standard deviation for annual temperature change is 0.56°C (cf. Table 1), 
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incorporated in our main dataset data on country-specific warming in the future 
period 2071-2095 compared to the reference period 1980-2004. These data 
represent the average projected warming for Representative Concentration 
Pathway (RCP) 8.5 (the business-as-usual scenario) for each country across all 
global climate models included in the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project, 
Phase 5 (CMIP5), upon which the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report was based22.  
These projections were used in conjunction with the benchmark estimates from 
Column (2) in Table 2 to predict the impact of future warming on TFP growth. 
Average warming by the end of the century for countries in our sample is 
3.912 °C, and there is no heterogeneity in warming between rich and poor 
countries.  
The results predict that, by the year 2095, climate change will entail a decrease 
of approximately 3 percentage points in TFP growth, on average, compared to 
a scenario without climate change. However, this aggregate prediction hides a 
sharp heterogeneity: TFP growth in poor countries will suffer from a reduction 
of 5.96%, compared to a decrease of only 0.11% in rich countries. If past 
relationships will continue to hold, and excluding both intensification and 
adaptation, annual TFP growth rate in poor countries could be reduced by about 
0.06% per year. Over almost a hundred years, total factor productivity in poor 
countries would be 5.30% below where it would be without climate change. 
This is an upper bound, as we estimated the short-run semi-elasticity rather than 
the long-run one. This extrapolation is not immune to concerns about external 
validity. 
 
In the worst case scenario, annual TFP growth in poor countries would be 
                                                 
interannual variability is quite large relative to the projected trend, so while this extrapolation 
should be interpreted with the usual caution, its implications should not be a priori dismissed. 
22 The data (for both temperature and precipitation change) were downloaded from: 
http://regclim.coas.oregonstate.edu/visualization/gccv/cmip5-global-climate-change 
viewer/index.html . 
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lowered by about 0.06% during this century. This is not trivial, considering that 
it would be an additional dynamic effect to be added to the current impact 
estimates, but it is much smaller than hypothesized and simulated in recent 
literature.  
 
In the simulation using DICE 2010 run by Dietz and Stern (2015), and in 
particular in their endogenous TFP model with standard assumptions about the 
damage function and climate sensitivity, annual global TFP growth rate is 
reduced by about 0.20 percentage points, for the period 2005-2205 and with a 
temperature increase of 5.7°C above pre-industrial levels. Using our estimates 
and their scenario, we find a value of 1.523*(4.9/200) = 0.04%23, roughly five 
times lower and, importantly, only for poor countries. 
 
Similarly, Moyer, Woolley, Matteson, Glotter and Weisbach (2014) alter the 
growth path of TFP in DICE, allowing for a reduction in the annual global 
growth rate by more than 0.20%, over a 300-year period and under a predicted 
temperature increase of 5.9°C above pre-industrial. Under these conditions, we 
would predict an annual decrease by 0.03%, but again only for poor countries. 
 
In Moore and Diaz (2015), who endogenize TFP in a two-region (rich and poor) 
version of DICE 2013R, using parameters calibrated on the empirical findings 
of Dell, Jones & Olken (2012), the decrease in annual TFP growth rate in poor 
countries is approximately 0.52%, over the period 2015-2105, with a 
temperature increase over the century of about 3°C. Conversely, our derived 
calculations for this simulation point to a reduction in the annual growth rate of 
TFP in poor countries by about 0.05 %, an order of magnitude lower than their 
projection.  
 
                                                 
23 In the DICE model, temperature in 2005 is already 0.83 °C above pre-industrial. 
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Unlike the papers above, we stress that once a certain income per capita 
threshold is reached, these negative impacts would disappear altogether. Our 
estimates point to an upper threshold of $34,400 income per capita (for hot 
countries), a value which, according to global projections, will be largely 
surpassed during this century. 
 
These results further increase concerns over distributional issues of future 
impacts. As Tol (2018) shows, it is widely accepted that poor countries will be 
the ones who will suffer the most from climate change impacts. This work 
confirms and reinforces this view, by detecting dynamic effects from 
temperature shocks, and their persistence over time, only in poor countries. 
Additionally, as explained in Inklaar and Timmer (2013), Keller (2004), Griffith, 
Redding, and Van Reenen (2004), TFP growth as a determinant of long-run 
economic growth is more important in poor countries than in rich ones. 
 
Finally, given that, as noted by Gillingham et al. (2015): “uncertainty in the 
growth of productivity (or output per capita) is known to be a critical parameter 
in determining all elements of climate change”, all this calls for 
complementarity between climate policy and poverty reduction (Schelling, 
1992). 
Section 7 
Discussion and conclusion 
 
We test the recently advanced hypothesis that climate change harms TFP growth 
by looking at the past relationship between TFP growth rates and temperature 
shocks. We find a negative relationship only in poor countries. The relationship 
is robust to alternative samples, alternative data, alternative specifications, and 
to spatial autocorrelation. There is some evidence that temperature shocks may 
have a negative effect in hot countries too. The estimated temperature effect on 
TFP growth probably explains the effect on economic growth found in previous 
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papers, and is probably explained by temperature effects on labour productivity. 
While statistically significant, our upper bound estimate suggest that climate 
change would reduce TFP growth by less than 0.1%. 
 
The findings of this paper confirm the results of Dell, Jones and Olken (2012), 
who also found a statistically significant but modestly sized relationship 
between temperature levels and economic growth only in poor countries, and 
that showed using lags and long differences a persistence of weather impacts in 
the medium run which is likely to mean the presence of growth effects other, or 
rather, than level output effects. Our results contradict the conclusions of Burke, 
Miguel and Hsiang (2015), who found large aggregate impacts of temperature 
on productivity. 
 
Using the first differences of TFP and temperature levels, this work not only 
alleviates the issue of non-stationarity in panel analysis which may tend to 
produce spurious results, but also directly addresses the issue of potential long-
run growth effects, since its main dependent variable is notably one of the main 
drivers of long-run economic growth (Solow, 1956). In this different 
perspective, an impact on annual TFP growth is already, per se a long-term 
impact. There is no need to use first differences, since in this scenario 
temperature shocks affects economic activity not through Equation (1), but 
directly through Equation (4). 
Conversely, Dell, Jones and Olken (2012) could not explicitly show the 
presence of growth effects. 
Interestingly, we also detect empirical evidence for persistence of impacts in 
poor countries, where the negative impacts of temperature shocks on TFP 
growth are not absorbed in the short run and cumulate over time.  
 
However, a number of limits and caveats for this work also need to be made 
clear. First: sample size and data quality. Both our samples only include less 
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than 70 countries (60 and 68, respectively). Although together they account for 
a large share of world GDP and population, sample size is indeed reduced. As 
for data quality, TFP data represent the so-called Solow residual, and in fact this 
is the way they are calculated in PWT 8.1 (Feenstra, Inklaar, & Timmer, 2013 
& 2015; Inklaar & Timmer, 2013). Therefore, the estimates are potentially 
affected by measurement error and a whole host of errors in the specification 
and the estimation of the production function used to derive TFP. Unfortunately, 
to the best of our knowledge there is no availability of other TFP datasets at the 
country level covering such a long timespan. Weather data as well notably suffer 
from measurement error and different data quality in different countries. 
However, the issue of measurement error is at least partially alleviated here 
since the results appear to be robust to sample choices, to different specifications 
of key explanatory variables, and to different weather data with different 
aggregation methods. 
 
Second, as already mentioned in the introduction, external validity with respect 
to future climate change. Again, weather variations are not climate variations: 
the first are random shorter-run temporal variations, the second are averages 
over several decades (Dell, Jones & Olken, 2014). In other words climate, as 
emphasized by Auffhammer, Hsiang, Schlenker and Sobel (2013), is a long 
average of weather at a given location. It is thus key to always keep in mind that 
a 1°C shock in a given year and place is not equivalent to a permanent 1°C 
global increase, and that projections like the simple extrapolation with regard to 
global warming we performed above typically suffer from this drawback. In 
other words, we only estimated the short-run semi-elasticity, whereas we need 
to know the long-run semi-elasticity. 
 
Third, future climate change, especially if pronounced as it is projected in some 
extreme emission scenarios (IPCC, 2013) may well entail consequences and 
effects which lie outside historical experience. Substantial sea level rise, a 
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thermohaline circulation slowdown, the release of methane from melting 
permafrost are all potential intensifying effects which are indeed not captured 
by this analysis, based on a period in which there was only limited climatic 
variability and limited warming. 
Such an intensification of impacts may well change the picture we depicted, 
both quantitively and qualitatively. 
 
Fourth, every forecast or projection based on this study implies the assumption 
that past historical relationship will continue to hold in the future. As argued in 
Dell, Jones and Olken (2014) and Tol (2018), this could indeed not be the case, 
either due to intensification of negative impacts or to adaptation through 
development in the long run. 
 
Fifth, total factor productivity is an aggregate measure, and changes in total 
factor productivity are due to a variety of changes in underlying economic 
phenomena. With our data it is impossible to open this black box, but future 
research should attempt this using micro-data and natural experiments. 
Particularly, our analysis should be repeated with TFP data by country, year, 
and industry – data which are, to the best of our knowledge, not yet available. 
 
Sixth, estimates of TFP may be biased by adaptation to climate change. If a 
country diverts investment from productive capital to defensive capital (e.g., 
seawalls), then this would register as a drop in total factor productivity. 
Defensive investment may be more likely after hot weather. Since temperature 
is autocorrelated, this would bias our estimates. There are no international data 
on defensive investment, let alone defensive investment to protect against 
weather shocks and climate change. We therefore cannot estimate the size of 
this bias. We suspect, however, that this bias is small as few countries have 
invested heavily in adaptive capacity. 
 
30 
 
The central finding of this work is that TFP growth rates of poor countries are 
affected by temperature shocks in recent past. Once again, poverty means 
vulnerability. However, this causal relationship between temperature, poverty 
and productivity growth is subjected to caveats and should be interpreted with 
caution. What this analysis suggests is the fact that weather shocks affect 
economic growth through the TFP channel only when coupled with poverty, not 
that climate change will harm future economic growth by affecting 
technological progress, as hypothesized in literature. Hence, given the 
preeminent importance of TFP growth for long-run development, and under the 
assumption that weather impacts have at least some external validity with regard 
to climate change, the main conclusions that stem from this paper are an 
increase of concerns over the inequality of future impacts, a policy guideline 
which considers poverty reduction as a crucial and paramount element of 
climate policy and, at the research level, a call for further studies on the potential 
dynamic effects of future climate change. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
       
 Mean Var sd Min Max Obs 
 
 
TFP growth rate 
 
   0.481 
 
15.485 
 
3.935 
 
-56.055 
 
26.759 
 
2760 
 
△Temp 0.012 0.318 0.564 -2.952 2.442 2760 
 
△Pre -0.014 5.942 2.438 -35.398 37.640 2760 
 
GDP_percap 8.480 1.022 1.011 6.084 10.353 2820 
 
Notes: 
TFP growth rate is the annual percentage change and expressed in natural logarithm. 
Temperature change is annual and expressed in degree Celsius. 
Precipitation change is annual and expressed in units of 100 mm per year. 
GDP per capita is in natural logarithm of 1990 international Geary - Khamis dollars. 
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Table 2 
Relationship between annual TFP growth rates and temperature changes 
 
Dependent 
variable: 
annual TFP 
growth rate 
 
 
 (1) 
 
 
  (2) 
 
 
(3) 
 
 
(4) 
 
 
(5) 
 
 
(6) 
        
 
△Temp 
 
 -0.485** 
 
 -0.029 
 
0.057 
 
0.098 
 
0.008 
 
0.051 
 (0.216)  (0.136) (0.143) (0.123) (0.134) (0.120) 
       
△Pre    -0.033  -0.042*  -0.047**  -0.048**  -0.049**  -0.051** 
 (0.023)  (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
       
Poor x △Temp      -1.493***   -1.195**     -1.315***  
   (0.404) (0.468)  (0.437)  
       
Hot x △Temp   -0.684       -0.612   
   (0.452) (0.429)   
       
Poor_2 x △Temp      -1.425***     -1.513*** 
    (0.420)  (0.410) 
       
Hot_2 x △Temp      -1.048**  -0.979** 
     (0.484) (0.481) 
       
_cons     1.416***       1.338***     1.280***     1.271***     1.284***     1.273*** 
 (0.327)   (0.331) (0.322) (0.324) (0.318) (0.319) 
N 2760  2760 2760 2760 2760 2760 
R2 0.208  0.215 0.216 0.217 0.216 0.218 
adj. R2 0.121  0.128 0.129 0.131 0.130 0.131 
AIC          14749.211 14727.177 14725.510  14720.275  14723.930  14718.702 
 
 
Total effect in poor 
countries 
Total effect in hot 
countries                          
 
       
 
                
    
 
-1.523***    
(0.406) 
  
 
-1.139**                 
(0.515) 
-0.627   
(0.402)                                      
                                                                                            
-1.327***             -1.307***             -1.462***                                              
(0.456)                (0.453)               (0.420) 
-0.515                 -1.040**              -0.928*         
(0.388)                (0.473)               (0.477)   
Notes: 
All specifications include country FE and Region x Time FE.                                                                                                                                  
Poor is a dummy with value 1 for countries with below median GDP per capita in 1960.                                                                                                                                           
Hot is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median average temperature in the 1960s.                                                                                     
Poor_2 is a dummy with value 1 for countries with below median GDP per capita.                                                                                                    
Hot_2 is a dummy with value 1 for countries with average temperature in the 1960s above the 75%.                                                                                                                                           
Temperature change is annual and expressed in degree Celsius. 
Precipitation change is annual and expressed in units of 100 mm per year. 
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the country level.                                                                                                                       
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 3 
Checking for non-linearity of temperature impacts – Square of temperature change 
 
Dependent 
variable: Annual 
TFP growth rate 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
∆Temp 
 
 -0.490** 
 
-0.037 
 
0.050 
 
0.092 
 
0.001 
 
0.045 
 (0.215) (0.134) (0.140) (0.120) (0.132) (0.117) 
       
(∆Temp)2 -0.110 -0.143* -0.151* -0.135** -0.151* -0.131* 
 (0.101) (0.077) (0.076) (0.067) (0.076) (0.066) 
       
∆Pre -0.033 -0.042* -0.046** -0.048** -0.049** -0.051** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
       
Poor x ∆Temp     -1.484***   -1.181**     -1.306***  
  (0.403) (0.451)  (0.434)  
       
Poor x (∆Temp)2  0.182 0.207  0.175  
  (0.343) (0.323)  (0.340)  
       
Hot x ∆Temp   -0.694 -0.611   
   (0.447) (0.425)   
       
Hot x (∆Temp)2   0.017 0.090   
   (0.430) (0.440)   
       
Poor_2 x ∆Temp       -1.421***     -1.507*** 
    (0.407)  (0.407) 
       
Poor_2 x (∆Temp)2    0.094  0.088 
    (0.346)  (0.353) 
       
Hot_2 x ∆Temp      -1.051** -0.980** 
     (0.479) (0.473) 
       
Hot_2 x (∆Temp)2     0.081 0.127 
     (0.621) (0.629) 
       
_cons     1.439***     1.355***     1.294***    1.284***     1.298***     1.287*** 
 (0.324) (0.325) (0.307) (0.307) (0.307) (0.307) 
N 2760 2760 2760 2760 2760 2760 
R2 0.208 0.215 0.216 0.217 0.216 0.218 
adj. R2 0.121 0.128 0.128 0.130 0.129 0.130 
AIC 14750.611 14728.335 14724.544 14719.561 14722.997 14717.998 
 
Total effect in 
poor countries 
 
Total effect in 
hot countries                          
 
    
     
 
                
    
 
-1.523***   
(0.406) 
  
 
 -1.132**                
(0.497) 
 
-0.648  
(0.400)                                      
                                         
-1.332***           -1.307***            -1.464***                                              
(0.443)              (0.452)              (0.420) 
 
-0.522               -1.048**             -0.929**          
(0.387)   (0.465)              (0.464)  
  
Notes: 
All specifications include country FE and Region x Time FE. Poor is a dummy with value 1 for countries with below median GDP per capita 
in 1960. Hot is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median average temperature in the 1960s. Poor_2 is a dummy with value 1 for 
countries with below median GDP per capita. Hot_2 is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median average temperature. 
Temperature change is annual and expressed in degree Celsius. Precipitation change is annual and expressed is in units of 100 mm per year. 
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the country level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 4 
Checking for non-linearity of temperature impacts – Temperature bins
Dependent variable: 
Annual TFP growth rate 
 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
∆Temp 
                  
0.884*** 
 
 -5.113** 
  
 (0.177) (2.464)   
     
Avg. temp. x ∆Temp   -0.110*** -0.059**   
 (0.018) (0.022)   
     
∆Pre  -0.051** -0.049** -0.051** -0.051** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
     
Avg. GDP per capita x ∆Temp    0.601**   
  (0.245)   
     
Cold x ∆Temp    0.028** -0.198 
   (0.012) (0.234) 
     
Mild x ∆Temp    -0.060**  -0.614** 
   (0.029) (0.293) 
     
Warm x ∆Temp    -0.062*** -0.229 
   (0.022) (0.210) 
     
Hot x ∆Temp     -0.082***  -0.233** 
   (0.016) (0.089) 
     
Cold x ∆Temp xAvg. GDP per capita    0.024 
    (0.025) 
     
Mild x ∆Temp    0.063* 
    (0.032) 
     
Warm x ∆Temp    0.021 
    (0.024) 
     
Hot x ∆Temp    0.019* 
    (0.011) 
     
_cons    1.258***    1.248***     1.237***    1.236*** 
 (0.314) (0.322) (0.312) (0.331) 
N 2760 2760 2760 2760 
R2 0.215 0.217 0.216 0.218 
adj. R2 0.129 0.131 0.129 0.130 
AIC 14723.915 14719.631 14723.828 14716.536 
Notes: 
All specifications include country FE and Region x Time FE. Avg. Temp. is country average temperature. Avg. GDP per 
capita is country average GDP per capita. Cold, Mild, Warm and Hot are dummies capturing average temperature quartiles. 
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the country level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
42 
 
Table 5 
Specifications with GDP per capita and Polity 2 
 
 
Dependent  
variable:  
annual TFP growth rate 
 
 
(1) 
 
 
(2) 
   
 
ΔTemp 
 
 -5.065** 
 
-0.518 
 (1.921) (0.318) 
   
ΔPre  -0.046**  -0.050** 
 (0.022) (0.022) 
   
Poor x ΔTemp   -0.823** 
  (0.328) 
   
Polity 2 x ΔTemp   0.062* 
  (0.032) 
   
Polity 2  -0.012 
  (0.034) 
   
GDP_percap -0.216  
 (0.689)  
   
GDP x ΔTemp     0.532***  
 (0.195)  
   
Hot x ΔTemp -0.675  
 (0.454)  
   
_cons 3.158    1.441*** 
 (6.143) (0.404) 
N 2760 2705 
R2 0.214 0.224 
adj. R2 0.127 0.136 
AIC 14355.504 6698.196 
 
Total effect in poor 
countries 
 
  
   -1.342*** 
(0.336) 
Notes: 
All specifications include country FE and Region x Time FE.                                                                                                                                                           
Poor is a dummy with value 1 for countries with below median GDP per capita in 
1960. Hot is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median average 
temperature in the 1960s. Temperature change is annual and expressed in degree 
Celsius. Precipitation change is annual and expressed in units of 100 mm per 
year. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the country level.                                                                                                                       
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 6 
Relationship between annual labour productivity growth rates and temperature changes 
 
 
Total effect in poor 
countries 
Total effect in hot 
countries                          
 
       
 
                
  
 
-1.627***    
(0.405) 
  
 
 -1.160** 
(0.526) 
-0.794*                                     
(0.416)                               
                                                                       
-1.427***             -1.394***              -1.607***                                              
(0.455)               (0.457)                (0.414) 
-0.621                -1.161**               -0.999*         
(0.395)               (0.501)                (0.503)   
Notes: 
All specifications include country FE and Region x Time FE.                                                                                                                                   
Poor is a dummy with value 1 for countries with below median GDP per capita in 1960.                                                                                                                                           
Hot is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median average temperature in the 1960s.                                                                                 
Poor_2 is a dummy with value 1 for countries with below median GDP per capita.                                                                                                     
Hot_2 is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median average temperature.                                                                                                                                           
Temperature change is annual and expressed in degree Celsius. 
Precipitation change is annual and expressed is in units of 100 mm per year. 
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the country level.                                                                                                                           
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
  
 
Dependent  
Variable: 
 
 
       (1) 
 
 
(2) 
 
 
(3) 
 
 
(4) 
 
 
(5) 
 
 
(6) 
Annual labour 
productivity growth 
      
 
△Temp 
 
 -0.543** 
 
-0.068 
 
0.037 
 
0.095 
 
       -0.027 
 
0.037 
 (0.227) (0.159) (0.164) (0.131) (0.155) (0.131) 
       
△Pre -0.037 -0.047*  -0.052**  -0.054**  -0.054**   -0.056** 
 (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
       
Poor x △Temp    -1.559*** -1.197**    -1.366***  
  (0.412) (0.481)  (0.448)  
       
Hot x △Temp   -0.831*      -0.717   
   (0.466) (0.434)   
       
Poor_2 x △Temp 
 
     -1.522***   -1.644*** 
    (0.421)  (0.411) 
       
Hot_2 x △Temp 
 
      -1.133**  -1.036** 
     (0.503) (0.498) 
       
_cons     2.535***     2.454***     2.383***      2.374***      2.395***     2.381*** 
 (0.515) (0.518) (0.511) (0.514) (0.507) (0.508) 
N 2760 2760 2760 2760 2760 2760 
R2 0.211 0.218 0.219 0.221 0.219 0.221 
adj. R2 0.125 0.132 0.133 0.135 0.133 0.135 
AIC 15259.399 15239.634 15237.136 15230.769 15236.537 15229.933 
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Figure 1 
TFP levels and average temperatures in 2006 
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Figure 2 
Marginal effect of ΔTemp at different GDP per capita levels – hot = 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-2
-1
0
1
2
E
ff
e
c
ts
 o
n
 L
in
e
a
r 
P
re
d
ic
ti
o
n
7.727 8.493 9.363 10.097 10.447
ln of GDP per capita level - Maddison Data
Average Marginal Effects of Ctem with 95% CIs
46 
 
Figure 3 
Marginal effect of ΔTemp at different GDP per capita levels – hot = 0 
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Figure 4 
Marginal effect of ΔTemp at different GDP per capita levels 
 – whole sample 
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Web Appendix 
 
(1) Construction of the RTFPNA Index in PWT 8.1 
 
 
Since version 8.0, the Penn World Table include data on TFP at the country level (Feenstra, Inklaar 
& Timmer, 2013). In particular, there are two measures of TFP in PWT 8.1. The first one is CTFP, 
where the prefix C stays for “current year”: this is a measure of TFP levels of countries in a given 
year compared to the US, whose TFP levels are 1 in each year. It is thus a measure of relative TFP 
levels which allows for comparisons among countries (Feenstra, Inklaar & Timmer, 2015), and can 
be seen as an index of technological catch-up or as the distance from the technological frontier 
(represented by the US). 
The other, and the one used in this study is RTFPNA, which is derived using the real GDP growth rate, 
in conjunction with the growth rates of capital stock and of the labour force (Feenstra, Inklaar & 
Timmer, 2013). As discussed above, RTFPNA is normalized to 1 in 2005 for all countries, and since 
we use natural logarithms in our specification, the normalized value for 2005 is 0. 
More specifically, Inklaar and Timmer (2013) describe how the productivity measurement starts from 
the following general production function: 
 
𝑌 = 𝐴𝑓(𝐾, 𝐿) = 𝐴𝐾𝛼(𝐸ℎ𝑐1−𝛼)                                     (A.1) 
 
where, in the second equality, labour input is defined as the product of the number of workers in the 
economy E times their average human capital hc and α is the output elasticity of capital. 
A second-order approximation to the production function f is represented by the Tӧrnqvist quantity 
index of factor inputs 𝑄𝑇, which can be used to compare inputs between  t-1  and t for a given country 
as follows: 
 
ln𝑄𝑡,𝑡−1
𝑇 =
1
2
(𝛼𝑡 + 𝛼𝑡−1)ln
𝐾𝑡
𝐾𝑡−1
+ [1 −  
1
2
(𝛼𝑡 + 𝛼𝑡−1)] ln
𝐿𝑡
𝐿𝑡−1
                 (A.2) 
 
To implement this equation, they make the assumption that the output elasticity of capital is 
approximated by the country’s share of GDP that is not earned by labour. They assume a common 
labour share neither across countries nor over time, i.e., the input index in equation (A.2) is the more 
flexible Tӧrnqvist index rather than the more common Cobb-Douglas function. 
Finally, growth of productivity over time is given by: 
 
𝑅𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑡,𝑡−1
𝑁𝐴 =  
𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡
𝑁𝐴
𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1
𝑁𝐴 𝑄𝑡,𝑡−1
𝑇⁄                                                      (A.3) 
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where 𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑁𝐴 stands for real GDP at constant national prices. 
For further information with regard to the construction of the RTFPNA index, see Feenstra, Inklaar 
and Timmer (2013), Feenstra, Inklaar and Timmer (2015) and Inklaar and Timmer (2013). 
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(2) Statistical tests 
 
A. Panel unit root tests 
 
In order to check that our main variables are stationary, we performed panel unit root tests for annual 
TFP growth, annual temperature change and annual precipitation change. In particular, we used two 
unit root tests which are both fit when N > T, as it is the case in our sample: the Im, Pesaran, and Shin 
(2003) test and the Harris and Tzavalis (1999) test. The results, reported in Tables A.1-A.6, confirm 
that the tested variables are stationary. 
 
Table A.1 
Im-Pesaran-Shin unit-root test for annual TFP growth 
 
Ho: All panels contain unit roots                                                Number of panels  =     60                   
Ha: Some panels are stationary                                                Number of periods =     46                 
AR parameter: Panel-specific                                            Asymptotics: T,N →Infinity               
Panel means:  Included                                                                                   sequentially                 
Time trend:   Included                                                    Cross-sectional means removed                
ADF regressions: No lags included 
 
                                                                             Fixed-N exact critical values 
                           Statistic         p-value                        1%      5%      10% 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------                        
t-bar                  -5.8532                                            -2.360  -2.310  -2.280 
t-tilde-bar         -4.3796 
Z-t-tilde-bar     -27.9582          0.0000 
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Table A.2 
Im-Pesaran-Shin unit-root test for △Temp 
 
Ho: All panels contain unit roots                                                Number of panels  =     60                    
Ha: Some panels are stationary                                                Number of periods =     46                  
AR parameter: Panel-specific                                              Asymptotics: T,N→Infinity             
Panel means:  Included                                                                                   sequentially                  
Time trend:   Included                                                    Cross-sectional means removed               
ADF regressions: No lags included 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                                                             Fixed-N exact critical values 
                           Statistic         p-value                        1%      5%      10% 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------                       
t-bar                  -9.7663                                            -2.360  -2.310  -2.280 
t-tilde-bar         -5.4829 
Z-t-tilde-bar     -38.5654          0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  
52 
 
Table A.3 
Im-Pesaran-Shin unit-root test for △Pre 
 
Ho: All panels contain unit roots                                                Number of panels  =     60                   
Ha: Some panels are stationary                                                Number of periods =     46                  
AR parameter: Panel-specific                                              Asymptotics: T,N →Infinity 
Panel means:  Included                                                                                   sequentially                   
Time trend:   Included                                                    Cross-sectional means removed                   
ADF regressions: No lags included 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                                                             Fixed-N exact critical values 
                           Statistic         p-value                        1%      5%      10% 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------                               
t-bar                 -10.2704                                           -2.360  -2.310  -2.280 
t-tilde-bar         -5.5661 
Z-t-tilde-bar     -39.3644          0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table A.4  
 Harris-Tzavalis unit-root test for annual TFP growth 
 
Ho: Panels contain unit roots                                                              Number of panels  =     60 
Ha: Panels are stationary                                                              Number of periods =     46               
AR parameter: Common                                                           Asymptotics: N → Infinity,                          
Panel means:  Included                                                                                            T fixed                
Time trend:   Included                                                     Cross-sectional means removed  
                        Statistic                                         z                               p-value         
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
rho                   0.1823                                     -50.3642                        0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table A.5  
 Harris-Tzavalis unit-root test for △Temp 
 
Ho: Panels contain unit roots                                                              Number of panels  =     60                    
Ha: Panels are stationary                                                              Number of periods =     46              
AR parameter: Common                                                        Asymptotics: N → Infinity,             
Panel means:  Included                                                                                           T fixed              
Time trend:   Included                                                     Cross-sectional means removed  
                        Statistic                                              z                                p-value         
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
rho                   -0.3900                                        -93.9377                          0.0000 
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Table A.6 
Harris-Tzavalis unit-root test for △Pre 
 
Ho: Panels contain unit roots                                                              Number of panels  =     60          
Ha: Panels are stationary                                                              Number of periods =     46                 
AR parameter: Common                                                           Asymptotics: N → Infinity,          
Panel means:  Included                                                                                            T fixed                  
Time trend:   Included                                                    Cross-sectional means removed 
                        Statistic                                              z                                p-value         
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
rho                   -0.4215                                        -96.3329                          0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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B. FE vs RE 
 
To test the appropriateness of a fixed effect - panel approach rather than a random effects (RE) 
specification, we performed a test using the approach suggested by Mundlak (1978). The traditional 
Hausman test, in fact, is not recommended when time fixed effects are included in the regressions, 
and is based on the assumption of homoskedasticity, which is very unlikely to hold in our sample. 
The Mundlak test, in contrast, allows for heteroskedastic errors and serial intracorrelation. 
Essentially, we performed a RE regression including panel-level means of our time-varying variables 
– in the specification we used, temperature change, precipitation change and the interaction between 
and the poor dummy – and then tested for the joint significance of the coefficients for the means time 
varying variables. The results, reported in Table A.7, are strongly in favour of a FE approach. 
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Table A.7 
Mundlak test – Random Effects GLS regression with added panel-level means 
 
  
Dependent variable: 
Annual TFP growth 
rate 
  
  (1) 
 
△Temp 
 
-0.029 
 (0.136) 
  
Poor x △Temp -1.493*** 
 (0.405) 
  
△Pre -0.042* 
 (0.023) 
  
Mean_△Temp -3.160 
 (6.413) 
  
Mean_ Poor x △Temp  29.436*** 
 (10.984) 
  
Mean_△Pre  2.456** 
 (1.138) 
  
_cons  2.575*** 
 (0.723) 
N  2760 
R2  0.226 
  
  
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
 
Test on the joint significance of the panel-level means for the time varying variables: 
 
 
(1)  Mean_△Temp = 0 
(2)  Mean_△Pre = 0 
(3)  Mean_ Poor x △Temp 
 
chi2( 3) = 9.40 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0245 
 
  
58 
 
(3)   Robustness checks 
 
A. Different sample 
 
We run the same regressions using a different sample of the same dataset, changing the composition 
of countries and the time period. In particular, we add 8 countries to the main sample: Bulgaria, 
Hungary, Kuwait, Panama, Paraguay, Poland, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Some of these countries are 
hot and rich, increasing the statistical power to distinguish between heat and affluence. The new time 
period is 1970 – 2006. Table A.8 provides some descriptive statistics for the new dataset, Table A.9 
the results for the main specification. 
 
As for the impact in poor countries, the results are very similar: the previous findings are confirmed 
in terms of magnitude, sign and significance, and if anything reinforced. This is probably due to the 
fact that some of the added countries, such as the Arab oil states, are very rich, very hot and with high 
TFP level (although concentrated in one sector). The robustness check conducted on Sample B 
reinforces the main thesis of this work: a negative causal relationship between annual TFP growth 
rates and temperature shocks only exists in poor countries, while the TFP growth rates of rich 
countries, regardless whether they are hot or cold, do not appear to suffer from temperature changes.  
In other words, the impacts of temperature on total factor productivity are conditional on the level of 
GDP per capita. 
 
B. Investigating the subsample of poor countries    
  
In Table A.10 we run a specification using only the subsample of poor countries, “poor” defined as 
having a below median GDP per capita in 1960.  The coefficient for △Temp is negative and 
significant, predicting a -1.8 percentage point decrease in the TFP growth rate for a 1°C increase. 
This confirms again the negative causal relationship in poor countries, which is shown graphically in 
Figure A.1. 
 
C. Exploring the “rich” interaction 
 
We check whether or not only in poor countries TFP growth is affected by temperature by inspecting 
its complement. We therefore run exactly the same specification of Table 2, but substitute the “poor” 
interaction with an interaction between annual temperature changes and a dummy for being rich, with 
“rich” being defined as having an above average GDP per capita in 1960. Additionally, we also 
include the alternative definition of “rich”, Rich_2, defined as having an above average GDP per 
capita, and interact it with temperature shocks. 
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The results are shown in Table A.11. Column (1) shows results for the baseline specification which 
only includes annual temperature and precipitation shocks and the “rich” interaction. Although at a 
first inspection the coefficient for △Temp and Rich*△Temp being both strongly significant, but of 
opposite sign, their linear combination at the bottom of Column (2) makes clear that the total effect 
of temperature on the TFP growth rate of rich countries is small and statistically insignificant. When 
we add the “hot” interaction in Column (2), the total effect of shocks in rich countries is again very 
small and insignificant. We repeat the same exercise in Columns (3) and (4), using the alternative 
definition of “hot”, with analogous results. Finally, in Column (5) and (6), we run two specifications 
with the different definition of “hot” as having above 75% percentile average temperature in the 1960s. 
Once again, the net effect in rich countries is again close to zero and insignificant.  
 
D. Joint interactions with poor and hot dummies   
 
Finally, we run two specifications in which we add in the regressions a double interaction term, 
namely between temperature changes, a dummy for being poor and a dummy for being hot, and we 
repeat these for both our definitions of poor and hot countries. Table A.12 shows the results. With the 
joint interaction included, temperature shocks significantly affect TFP growth not only in poor 
countries but also in hot countries. The effect is larger in poor countries than in hot countries, but the 
difference is not significant. The joint effect is similar in size as above. 
 
E. World Bank classification of countries 
 
Our classification between rich and poor countries is arbitrary. It is thus important to make sure the 
results hold when using internationally accepted classifications. We repeat the baseline regressions 
(cf. Table 2) but splitting countries between ‘High-Income economies’ and ‘Non-high income 
economies’, following the official list of high income economies by the World Bank1.  The results are 
reported in Table A.13. A causal relationship between TFP growth and temperature shocks only exists 
in non-high income economies, and impacts are very similar to those for poor countries in our 
benchmark specification.                                                                                                
 
F. Labour force and capital stock   
 
Dell, Jones and Olken (2012) studied the impact of temperature variations on the growth rate of per 
capita income. Their results are qualitatively similar to ours: unusually hot years negatively affect 
                                                 
1 Available at: https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519#High_income . 
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growth, but only in poor countries. We investigate the growth rate of total factor productivity, and 
hypothesize that this explains Dell, Jones and Olken’s results. However, their result could also be 
explained, at least partly, by changes in the labour force or capital stock. 
 
Table A.14 shows the results for regressions of the annual growth rate of the number of persons 
employed2 and the annual growth rate of real capital stock on temperature and precipitation change. 
The explanatory variables are both statistically insignificant in the main specification, and only the 
total effect of temperature change on the growth rate of the capital stock in poor countries is positive 
and weakly significant at the 10% level. In other words, Dell, Jones and Olken’s temperature impact 
on income growth is due to the effect of temperature on total factor productivity growth, perhaps 
dampened by an effect of temperature on capital deepening. 
 
G. Regressions with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors  
 
Countries are not independent from each other. In the specifications above, we do not check or correct 
for spatial autocorrelation. As Dell, Jones & Olken (2014) notice, in the weather-economy literature 
this is usually accomplished by making use of Conley (1999) standard errors which allow correlation 
to decay smoothly with distance. However, the use of Conley (1999) standard errors would make 
little sense in our sample, given that the choice of common distance cut-off points would be equally 
applied to countries as different in geographical size as China and Trinidad and Tobago. Hence, we 
opted for the use of Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors, which are robust to cross-sectional / 
spatial and temporal dependence. 
 
Table A.15 reports the results of the baseline FE regressions for the main sample, Table A.16 for the 
alternative sample. The significance of the coefficients is slightly diminished in some of the 
specifications, but the overall picture is that our core findings are not altered when taking into account 
the possibility of spatial dependence between countries. 
 
H. Temperature lags 
                                                                                    
Dell, Jones and Olken (2014) investigate the potential impacts of lagged temperature to check for 
persistence, and find evidence pointing in this direction. But their dependent variable is GDP growth, 
so this is step is necessary for them to try and disentangle static effects from dynamic effects. This is 
not true in our specification: since TFP growth is the driver of long-run development an impact on 
                                                 
2 Data on the size of the labour force were incomplete in PWT 8.1. 
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TFP growth is per se a growth effect. Still, checking for the impacts of lagged temperature shocks is 
important to understand if there is persistence of impacts and if there is a substantial cumulative effect. 
Table A.17 reports the results of regressions including five lags of temperature shocks. First, the 
qualitative findings remain the same: only poor countries are affected. Second, there is persistence in 
poor countries: cumulative impacts of all temperature coefficients are very large, more than 9%. 
However, while the first lag is significant, later lags are not. That is, the impact of hot weather spills 
into the next year. This is partly a mechanistic effect, as the calendar year does not coincide with the 
meteorological year. There are also genuine spillovers, as hot weather delays construction and as bad 
harvests reduce the supply of seed material. Third, no evidence of a significant persistence is found 
for non-poor countries. Such a pattern reinforces our conclusion that temperature shocks increase 
inequality between countries, by showing that impacts in poor countries are prolonged over time and 
not absorbed in the short run.  
 
I. Different weather data 
 
Since both TFP and weather data are notably affected by measurement errors, to partially alleviate 
these concerns we perform exactly the same analysis, in both samples, but using another weather 
dataset, the CRUCY Version 3.23 by the Climatic Research Unit (CRU) of the University of East 
Anglia (CRU, 2016) . Furthermore, this dataset uses a different weighting scheme with respect to our 
main source of weather data: the CRU data are aggregated at the country levels using area weights, 
rather than population weights as in the first case, which means that the aggregated data now represent 
the average weather experienced by a place, as opposed to the average weather experienced by a 
person  (Dell, Jones & Olken, 2014).  This is not a trivial difference: in countries like United States, 
Australia, Canada, China, large and scarcely populated areas will dominate the national average 
temperature when using area weights. This double difference, both of source and aggregation method, 
takes to weather data that are quite different from those used in our main specification3, and thus we 
reckon this constitutes a useful and reliable check for the robustness of our findings4. Table A.19 
replicates the specification of Table 2 for the main dataset using the CRU data. 
The results are remarkably consistent with those emerged from the baseline analysis: the negative 
effect of temperature shocks on TFP growth rates only comes through being poor, not through being 
hot, and there is no such causal relationship in rich countries. This consistency is further confirmed 
when repeating the same exercise but using Sample B. Estimates this check can be found in Table 
A.20: results are similar. 
                                                 
3 See Table A.18 for descriptive statistics of the CRU weather variables. 
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J. Excluding precipitation 
 
Even though we highlighted how the risk of omitted variable bias is a concrete one when dealing with 
weather variables, one could also make the case against including precipitation in our specification. 
Therefore, in Table A.21 we show what happens if we exclude precipitation from the regressions: the 
coefficients for temperature, and their significance, remain almost unchanged. 
 
K. Heterogeneity with respect to precipitation impacts 
 
Dell, Jones & Olken (2012) also include control variables which interact precipitation with “poor” 
and “hot” dummies. We do not do this in our main specification, because we are primarily interested 
in temperature. However, one could suspect that adding interactions for precipitation as well could 
change the results. To make sure this is not the case, and also to investigate whether there is 
heterogeneity of precipitation impacts with regard to poor or hot countries, in Table A.22 we add 
these precipitation interactions, but do not find any significant evidence supporting this heterogeneity. 
In addition, the impacts from temperature shocks in poor countries are slightly larger. 
 
L. Using temperature and precipitation levels 
 
In our main specification, we regress annual TFP growth rate and annual temperature and 
precipitation changes. Dell, Jones & Olken (2012), instead, regress their dependent variable, GDP 
growth, on temperature and precipitation levels. We argue above that we choose to using annual 
changes for our weather regressors because of the trend-stationary nature of temperature data. 
However, to ensure our results are not driven by the choice of first-differencing weather data, in Table 
A.23 we regress TFP growth on temperature and precipitation levels, and check for the heterogeneity 
of temperature impacts as in our main specification reported in Table 2. 
Our core findings are not altered by the use of levels instead of first differences. 
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Table A.8 
Descriptive Statistics – Sample B 
 
       
 Mean Var Sd Min Max Obs 
 
 
TFP growth rate 
 
0.0475 
 
18.07 
 
4.251 
 
-57.82 
 
37.10 
 
2448 
 
△Temp 0.0220 0.327 0.572 -2.952 2.442 2448 
 
△Pre -0.0198 5.890 2.427 -35.40 37.64 2448 
 
GDP_percap 8.619 0.945 0.972 6.084 10.67 2516 
 
Notes: 
TFP growth rate is the annual percentage change and expressed in natural logarithm. 
Temperature change is annual and expressed in degree Celsius. 
Precipitation change is annual and expressed in units of 100 mm per year. 
GDP per capita is in natural logarithm of 1990 international Geary - Khamis dollars. 
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Table A.9 
Relationship between annual TFP growth rates and temperature changes – Sample B 
 
 Dependent 
variable:  
Annual TFP 
growth rate 
 
 
(1) 
 
 
(2) 
 
 
(3) 
 
 
(4) 
 
 
(5) 
 
 
(6) 
        
  
△Temp 
 
-0.345* 
 
0.053 
 
0.087 
 
0.071 
 
0.077 
 
0.075 
  (0.193) (0.111) (0.114) (0.112) (0.113) (0.113) 
        
 △Pre -0.033   -0.041**   -0.043**   -0.046**   -0.043**   -0.046** 
   (0.020) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) 
        
 Poor x △Temp     -1.200***    -1.125***     -1.198***  
   (0.318) (0.328)  (0.318)  
        
 Hot x △Temp   -0.230 -0.093   
    (0.334) (0.323)   
        
 Poor_2 x △Temp       -1.308***     -1.337*** 
     (0.314)  (0.314) 
        
 Hot_2 x △Temp     -0.244 -0.196 
      (0.316) (0.319) 
        
 _cons    1.362***     1.295***     1.282***     1.283***     1.290***     1.284*** 
  (0.307) (0.304) (0.302) (0.303) (0.302) (0.303) 
 N 2448 2448 2448 2448 2448 2448 
 R2 0.198 0.202 0.202 0.203 0.202 0.203 
 adj. R2 0.121 0.126 0.126 0.127 0.126 0.127 
 AIC 13476.708 13464.522 13466.184 13463.170 13466.210 13463.021 
 
Total effect in poor 
countries 
Total effect in hot 
countries                          
 
       
 
                
    
 
 -1.147***    
(0.351) 
  
 
-1.037***               
(0.370) 
-0.143   
(0.318)                                      
                                                                              
-1.237***                 -1.121***            -1.262***                                              
(0.354)                   (0.355)              (0.354) 
-0.022                    -0.166                -0.120                       
(0.314)                   (0.309)              (0.313)   
 Notes: 
All specifications include country FE and Region x Time FE.                                                                                                                              
Poor is a dummy with value 1 for countries with below median GDP per capita in 1970.                                                                                                                                           
Hot is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median average temperature in the 1970s.                                                                                    
Poor_2 is a dummy with value 1 for countries with below median GDP per capita.                                                                                                          
Hot_2 is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median average temperature.                                                                                                                                           
Temperature change is annual and expressed in degree Celsius. 
Precipitation change is annual and expressed in units of 100 mm per year. 
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the country level.                                                                                                                                        
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
Table A.10 
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Annual TFP growth rates and temperature changes in poor countries 
 
 
                                                          Annual TFP growth rate 
 
 
△Temp 
 
-1.762*** 
 (0.459) 
  
△Pre -0.067 
 (0.044) 
  
_cons   1.745*** 
 (0.378) 
N   1380 
R2   0.226 
adj. R2   0.073 
AIC 7863.372 
 
 
Notes: 
The specification includes country FE and Region x Time FE.                                                                                                                        
Temperature change is annual and expressed in degree Celsius. 
Precipitation change is annual and expressed in units of 100 mm per year. 
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the country level. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table A.11 
Relationship between annual TFP growth rates and temperature changes in rich countries 
 
Dependent          
variable: 
Annual TFP 
growth rate 
 
 
(1) 
 
 
(2) 
 
 
(3) 
 
 
(4) 
 
 
(5) 
 
 
(6) 
 
△Temp 
 
   -1.523*** 
 
 -1.139** 
 
   -1.667*** 
  
   -1.327*** 
 
  -1.307*** 
 
  -1.462*** 
 (0.406) (0.515) (0.369) (0.456) (0.453) (0.420) 
       
△Pre -0.042*  -0.047** -0.045*  -0.048**  -0.049**  -0.051** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
       
Rich x △Temp     1.493***    1.195**      1.315***  
 (0.404) (0.468)   (0.437)  
       
Hot x △Temp  -0.684  -0.612   
  (0.452)  (0.429)   
       
Rich_2 x △Temp       1.683***     1.425***      1.513*** 
   (0.375) (0.420)  (0.410) 
       
Hot_2 x △Temp      -1.048**  -0.979** 
     (0.484) (0.481) 
       
_cons     1.338***     1.280***     1.323***     1.271***     1.284***     1.273*** 
 (0.331) (0.322) (0.333) (0.324) (0.318) (0.319) 
N 2760 2760 2760 2760 2760 2760 
R2 0.215 0.216 0.216 0.217 0.216 0.218 
adj. R2 0.128 0.129 0.130 0.131 0.130 0.131 
AIC 14727.177 14725.510 14721.291 14720.275 14723.930 14718.702 
 
 
Total effect in rich  
countries 
 
-0.029  
(0.136)   
    
 
 0.057    
(0.143)                   
 
  0.016                 
(0.125) 
                                                                             
‘0.098                  0.008                         0.051                                         
(0.123)               (0.134)                (0.120)          
Notes: 
All specifications include country FE and Region x Time FE.                                                                                                                                   
Rich is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median GDP per capita in 1960.                                                                            
Hot is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median average temperature in the 1960s.                                                                                                   
Rich_2 is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median GDP per capita.                                                                                                    
Hot_2 is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median average temperature.                                                                                                                                                                                                     
Temperature change is annual and expressed in degree Celsius. 
Precipitation change is annual and expressed in units of 100 mm per year. 
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the country level.                                                                                                                                            
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table A.12 
Specification with a double interaction term 
 
Dependent variable: annual TFP growth rate (1) (2) 
 
△Temp 
 
0.126 
 
0.066 
 (0.131) (0.122) 
   
△Pre  -0.047**  -0.051** 
 (0.023) (0.024) 
   
Poor x △Temp  -1.576**  
 (0.765)  
   
Hot x △Temp   -1.170***  
 (0.252)  
   
Poor x Hot x △Temp 0.919  
 (0.896)  
   
Poor_2 x △Temp     -1.570*** 
  (0.455) 
   
Hot_2 x △Temp     -1.412*** 
  (0.427) 
   
Poor_2 x Hot_2 x △Temp  0.571 
  (0.814) 
   
_cons     1.274***    1.258*** 
 (0.316) (0.320) 
N 2760 2760 
R2 0.216 0.218 
adj. R2 0.129 0.131 
AIC 14723.706 14718.412 
Total effect in hot and poor countries    -1.701***     -2.344*** 
    (0.449)     (0.515) 
Notes: 
All specifications include country FE and Region x Time FE. 
Poor is a dummy with value 1 for countries with below median GDP per capita in 1960. 
Hot is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median average temperature in the 1960s. 
Poor_2 is a dummy with value 1 for countries with below median GDP per capita. 
Hot_2 is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median average temperature. 
Temperature change is annual and expressed in degree Celsius. 
Precipitation change is annual and expressed is in units of 100 mm per year. 
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the country level. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table A.13 
High-income economies vs Non-high-income economics  
(World Bank classification) 
Dependent variable: 
annual TFP growth rate 
 
 (1) 
 
  (2) 
 
(3) 
     
 
△Temp 
 
0.092 
 
0.137 
 
0.108 
 (0.123) (0.120) (0.118) 
    
△Pre -0.044* -0.047** -0.049** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
    
Non-High Income Economies x △Temp   -1.699***   -1.466***    -1.521*** 
 (0.348) (0.437) (0.398) 
    
Hot x △Temp  -0.479  
  (0.479)  
    
Hot_2 x △Temp   -0.867* 
   (0.516) 
    
_cons     1.281***     1.248***     1.242*** 
 (0.326) (0.321) (0.316) 
N 2760  2760 2760 
R2 0.216 0.217 0.217 
adj. R2 0.130 0.131 0.131 
AIC 14720.315 14720.630 14718.813 
 
Total effect in non-high-income economies 
 
Total effect in hot countries                          
    
-1.607***   
(0.342) 
 
 
-1.329***  
(0.467)    
-0.342             
(0.452) 
 
-1.414***           
(0.401) 
-0.760                                                                          
(0.526) 
Notes: 
All specifications include country FE and Region x Time FE. Non-high-income economies is a dummy with value 1 for 
countries not included in the World Bank classification of “High-income economies”. Hot is a dummy with value 1 for 
countries with above median average temperature in the 1960s. Hot_2 is a dummy with value 1 for countries with average 
temperature in the 1960s above the 75% percentile. Temperature change is annual and expressed in degree Celsius. 
Precipitation change is annual and expressed in units of 100 mm per year. Standard errors are in parentheses and are 
clustered at the country level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 . 
 
69 
 
Table A.14 
Regressions with number of persons employed and capital stock as dependent variables 
 
     
(1) 
 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 Growth rate 
in the number of 
persons employed 
Growth rate 
in the number of 
persons employed 
Capital stock 
growth rate 
 
Capital stock 
growth rate 
     
 
△Temp 
 
0.068 
 
0.016 
 
3.610 
 
0.663 
 (0.079) (0.096) (2.335) (0.560) 
     
Poor x △Temp   0.172  9.661* 
        (0.152)       (5.465) 
     
△Pre 0.004 0.005       -0.174 -0.114 
 (0.014)       (0.014) (0.322) (0.338) 
     
     
_cons     2.533***     2.542*** 4.106 4.608 
 (0.439) (0.437) (4.347) (4.338) 
N 2760 2760 2760 2760 
R2 0.171 0.172 0.129 0.132 
adj. R2 0.080 0.081 0.034 0.037 
AIC 10968.569 10969.314 27815.168 27808.350 
 
 
Total effect in 
poor countries 
  
0.188 
(0.126) 
 
 
10.323* 
(5.866) 
 
   
 
 
  
Notes: 
All specifications include country FE and Region x Time FE.                                                                                                                                                    
Poor is a dummy with value 1 for countries with below median GDP per capita in 1960.                                                                                                                                           
Temperature change is annual and expressed in degree Celsius. 
Precipitation change is annual and expressed is in units of 100 mm per year. 
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the country level.                                                                                                             
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table A.15 
Baseline specification with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors 
 
Dependent 
variable: annual 
TFP growth rate 
 
   (1) 
 
      (2) 
 
      (3) 
 
      (4) 
 
        (5) 
 
      (6) 
 
△Temp 
 
 -0.485** 
 
-0.029 
 
0.057 
 
0.098 
 
0.008 
 
0.051 
 (0.200) (0.130) (0.164) (0.164) (0.134) (0.142) 
       
△Pre   -0.033 -0.042* -0.047* -0.048* -0.049* -0.051* 
 (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
       
Poor x △Temp    -1.493***  -1.195**    -1.315***  
  (0.432) (0.566)  (0.448)  
       
Hot x △Temp       -0.684 -0.612   
   (0.487) (0.470)   
       
Poor_2 x △Temp     -1.425**    -1.513*** 
    (0.565)  (0.443) 
       
Hot_2 x △Temp      -1.048**  -0.979** 
     (0.457) (0.431) 
       
_cons 0.184  0.402*   0.429**   0.480**   0.470**   0.519** 
 (0.166) (0.212) (0.200) (0.204) (0.204) (0.208) 
N 2760 2760 2760 2760 2760 2760 
Within R2 0.208 0.215 0.216 0.217 0.216 0.218 
       
Total effect in 
poor countries 
Total effect in hot 
countries                          
 
       
              
    -1.523***   
(0.462) 
  
-1.139*                
(0.660) 
-0.627  
(0.383)                                      
-1.327**        -1.307***         -1.462***                                                
(0.644)         (0.487)           (0.472) 
-0.515          -1.040**          -0.928**         
(0.390) (0.412)           (0.383)   
Notes: 
All specifications include country FE and Region x Time FE.                                                                                                                         
Poor is a dummy with value 1 for countries with below median GDP per capita in 1960.                                                                                                                                           
Hot is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median average temperature in the 1960s.                                            
Poor_2 is a dummy with value 1 for countries with below median GDP per capita.                                                              
Hot_2 is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median average temperature.                                                                                                                                           
Temperature change is annual and expressed in degree Celsius. 
Precipitation change is annual and expressed is in units of 100 mm per year. 
Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are in parentheses, and allow up to two lags of autocorrelation.                                                                                                               
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table A.16 
Baseline specification with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors – Sample B 
 
Dependent 
variable: annual 
TFP growth rate 
 
 
(1) 
 
 
(2) 
 
 
(3) 
 
 
(4) 
 
 
(5) 
 
 
(6) 
 
       
 
△Temp 
 
  -0.345*** 
 
0.053 
 
0.087 
 
0.071 
 
0.077 
 
0.075 
 (0.128) (0.172) (0.150) (0.138) (0.154) (0.141) 
       
△Pre -0.033 -0.041*  -0.043**  -0.046**  -0.043**  -0.046** 
 (0.020) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.022) 
       
Poor x △Temp    -1.200***  -1.125**    -1.198***  
  (0.354) (0.479)  (0.360)  
       
Hot x △Temp   -0.230 -0.093   
   (0.522) (0.564)   
       
Poor_2 x △Temp     -1.308**    -1.337*** 
    (0.568)  (0.392) 
       
Hot_2 x △Temp           -0.244     -0.196 
     (0.724) (0.710) 
       
_cons    -0.543*** 0.158 0.127     0.747***       -0.037     0.796*** 
 (0.084) (0.120) (0.135) (0.137) (0.064) (0.115) 
N 2448 2448 2448 2448 2448 2448 
Within R2 0.198 0.202 0.202 0.203 0.202 0.203 
       
       
 
Total effect in poor 
countries 
Total effect in hot 
countries                          
 
       
 
                
    
 
-1.147*** 
(0.281)             
            
  
 
-1.037**               
(0.451) 
-0.143  
(0.552)                                      
                                                                
-1.237**             -1.121***          -1.262***                                              
(0.546)               (0.335)            (0.401) 
-0.022                -0.166               -0.120          
(0.589)    (0.825)             (0.765)   
Notes: 
All specifications include country FE and Region x Time FE.                                                                                                                                    
Poor is a dummy with value 1 for countries with below median GDP per capita in 1970.                                                                                                                                           
Hot is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median average temperature in the 1970s.                                                                           
Poor_2 is a dummy with value 1 for countries with below median GDP per capita.                                                                                                     
Hot_2 is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median average temperature.                                                                                                                                           
Temperature change is annual and expressed in degree Celsius. 
Precipitation change is annual and expressed is in units of 100 mm per year. 
Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are in parentheses, and allow up to two lags of autocorrelation.                                                                                                                                                         
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
  
72 
 
Table A.17 
Lagged impacts of temperature shocks – 5 lags 
Dependent variable: annual 
TFP growth rate 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
∆Temp  -0.662** -0.008 -0.003 0.060 0.036 0.107 
 (0.292) (0.157) (0.178) (0.145) (0.156) (0.125) 
       
L1.∆Temp -0.370* -0.029 -0.141 -0.074 -0.032 0.047 
 (0.221) (0.169) (0.169) (0.153) (0.167) (0.150) 
       
∆Pre -0.023 -0.032 -0.036 -0.037 -0.038 -0.038 
 (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.025) 
       
Poor x ∆Temp    -2.201***   -2.145***    -1.982***  
  (0.582) (0.705)  (0.577)  
       
Poor x L1.∆Temp   -1.230**   -1.659***  -1.124*  
  (0.548) (0.592)  (0.572)  
       
Hot x ∆Temp   -0.172 -0.012   
   (0.650) (0.601)   
       
Hot x L1.∆Temp   0.802 0.924   
   (0.775) (0.714)   
       
Poor_2 x ∆Temp      -2.553***    -2.319*** 
    (0.623)  (0.540) 
       
Poor_2 x L1.∆Temp      -2.021***   -1.457** 
    (0.489)  (0.554) 
       
Hot_2 x ∆Temp     -1.154 -1.058 
     (0.711) (0.720) 
       
Hot_2 x L1.∆Temp     -0.542 -0.450 
     (1.084) (1.092) 
 
cons 
     
    1.481*** 
   
    1.440*** 
   
    1.360*** 
    
    1.354*** 
  
    1.393*** 
    
    1.361*** 
 (0.342) (0.362) (0.361) (0.365) (0.344) (0.347) 
N 2460 2460 2460 2460 2460 2460 
R2 0.202 0.214 0.216 0.218 0.216 0.219 
adj. R2 0.113 0.124 0.124 0.126 0.124 0.127 
AIC 13115.518 13079.949 13072.849 13065.660 13072.576 13064.793 
 
Total effect of all 
temperature coefficients 
Total effect of all 
temperature coefficients in 
poor countries 
Total effect of all 
temperature coefficients in 
hot countries                          
 
-1.658 
(1.074) 
 
                
  
0.473    
(0.707) 
 -6.523***  
(2.451) 
 
 
-0.029      
(0.762) 
 
  -9.273***                      
(2.759) 
 
 
3.187         
(2.271) 
 
-0.150               
(0.743) 
 -8.256**  
(3.241) 
 
2.932    
(2.834) 
 
0.505        
(0.692) 
 -6.160**   
(2.700) 
 
-1.142       
(4.978) 
 
 
0.307    
(0.634) 
-5.479*  
(2.923) 
 
-1.949   
(5.009) 
Notes: All specifications include five temperature lags and the relative interactions, but only the first lag is reported in the table because of space 
constraints. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the country level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table A.18 
CRU Weather Data – Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
       
 Mean Var sd Min Max Obs 
 
 
△Temp_2 
 
0.015 
 
0.303 
 
0.550 
 
-3.000 
 
2.700 
 
2760 
 
△Pre_2 0.002 4.877 2.208 -16.361 16.613 2760 
 
Notes: 
Temperature change is annual and expressed in degree Celsius. 
Precipitation change is annual and expressed in units of 100 mm per year. 
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Table A.19 
Relationship between annual TFP growth rates and temperature changes – CRU Data 
 
 Dependent 
variable:              
Annual TFP 
growth rates 
 
 
 
(1) 
 
 
(2) 
 
 
(3) 
 
 
(4) 
 
 
(5) 
 
 
(6) 
  
△Temp 
 
-0.288 
 
0.100 
 
0.145 
 
0.136 
 
0.104 
 
0.124 
  (0.198) (0.108) (0.114) (0.111) (0.113) (0.108) 
        
 △Pre -0.034 -0.043 -0.046 -0.046 -0.043 -0.045 
  (0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) 
        
 Poor x △Temp     -1.411***    -1.297***     -1.400***  
   (0.396) (0.435)  (0.428)  
        
 Hot x △Temp   -0.337 -0.113   
    (0.383) (0.402)   
        
 Poor_2 X △Temp       -1.553***     -1.599*** 
     (0.446)  (0.416) 
        
 Hot_2 x △Temp     -0.076 -0.015 
      (0.406) (0.404) 
        
 _cons     1.409***  1.352***     1.333***     1.331***     1.350***     1.337*** 
  (0.329)     (0.330) (0.334) (0.335) (0.328) (0.330) 
 N 2760 2760 2760 2760 2760 2760 
 R2 0.206 0.212 0.212 0.213 0.212 0.213 
 adj. R2 0.119 0.125 0.125 0.126 0.125 0.126 
 AIC 14755.501 14737.214 14738.333 14734.320 14739.186 14734.410 
 
Total effect in poor 
countries 
Total effect in hot 
countries                          
 
       
 
                
    
 
-1.311***    
(0.401) 
  
 
 -1.152**               
(0.470) 
-0.192   
(0.343)                                      
                                                                                           
-1.416***              -1.296***             -1.475***                                              
(0.478)                 (0.449)               (0.434) 
 0.023                    0.028                  0.109         
(0.371)                 (0.381)               (0.385)   
Notes: 
All specifications include country FE and Region x Time FE.                                                                                                                                   
Poor is a dummy with value 1 for countries with below median GDP per capita in 1960.                                                                                                                                                   
Hot is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median average temperature in the 1960s.                                                                                    
Poor_2 is a dummy with value 1 for countries with below median GDP per capita.                                                                                                   
Hot_2 is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median average temperature.                                                                                                                                           
Temperature change is annual and expressed in degree Celsius. 
Precipitation change is annual and expressed in units of 100 mm per year. 
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the country level.                                                                                                                              
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table A.20 
Relationship between annual TFP growth rates and temperature changes - 
 Sample B & CRU Data 
 
 Dependent 
variable:        
Annual TFP growth 
rate 
 
 
(1) 
 
 
(2) 
 
 
(3) 
 
 
(4) 
 
 
(5) 
 
 
(6) 
        
  
△Temp_2 
 
-0.155 
 
0.141 
 
0.139 
 
0.118 
 
0.112 
 
0.104 
  (0.158) (0.101) (0.106) (0.105) (0.103) (0.104) 
        
 △Pre_2 -0.043 -0.053* -0.052* -0.053* -0.050* -0.051* 
  (0.029) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) 
        
 Poor x △Temp_2     -1.001***    -1.005***     -1.010***  
   (0.279) (0.279)  (0.278)  
        
 Hot x △Temp_2   0.014 0.109   
    (0.321) (0.315)   
        
 Poor_2 x △Temp_2       -1.126***     -1.108*** 
     (0.273)  (0.278) 
        
 Hot_2 x △Temp_2     0.322 0.368 
      (0.312) (0.311) 
        
 _cons     1.344***     1.310***     1.310***     1.313***     1.311***         1.310*** 
  (0.304) (0.304) (0.305) (0.305) (0.305) (0.306) 
 N 2448 2448 2448 2448 2448 2448 
 R2 0.197 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 
 adj. R2 0.121 0.123 0.123 0.124 0.123 0.124 
 AIC 13479.345 13472.425 13474.424 13472.862 13473.928 13472.283 
 
Total effect in poor 
countries 
Total effect in hot 
countries                          
 
       
 
                
    
 
-0.860***    
(0.301) 
  
 
-0.866***               
(0.306) 
  0.153   
(0.302)                                      
                                                                                      
-1.007***              -0.898***              -1.004***                                              
(0.300)                 (0.304)                (0.307) 
 0.228                    0.434                   0.472          
(0.299)                 (0.305)                (0.304)   
 
Notes: 
All specifications include country FE and Region x Time FE.                                                                                                                                 
Poor is a dummy with value 1 for countries with below median GDP per capita in 1970.                                                                                                                                           
Hot is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median average temperature in the 1970s.                                                                                 
Poor_2 is a dummy with value 1 for countries with below median GDP per capita.                                                                                              
Hot_2 is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median average temperature.                                                                                                                                           
Temperature change is annual and expressed in degree Celsius. 
Precipitation change is annual and expressed in units of 100 mm per year. 
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the country level.                                                                                                                               
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table A.21 
Omitting precipitation 
 
Notes: 
All specifications include country FE and Region x Time FE.                                                                                                                                         
Poor is a dummy with value 1 for countries with below median GDP per capita in 1960.                                                                                                                                           
Hot is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median average temperature in the 1960s.                                                                                        
Poor_2 is a dummy with value 1 for countries with below median GDP per capita.                                                                                                
Hot_2 is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median average temperature.                                                                                                                                           
Temperature change is annual and expressed in degree Celsius. 
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the country level.                                                                                                                          
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
 
 
Dependent 
variable: 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
Annual TFP 
growth rate 
      
 
∆Temp 
 
 -0.480** 
 
-0.031 
 
0.049 
 
0.089 
 
0.003 
 
0.045 
 (0.215) (0.135) (0.143) (0.123) (0.133) (0.119) 
       
Poor x ∆Temp    -1.464***  -1.183**    -1.295***  
  (0.401) (0.465)  (0.433)  
       
Hot x ∆Temp   -0.639       -0.568   
   (0.450) (0.428)   
       
Poor_2 x ∆Temp      -1.407***    -1.488*** 
    (0.417)  (0.406) 
       
Hot_2 x ∆Temp      -0.969** -0.899* 
     (0.477) (0.475) 
       
_cons     1.400***     1.320***     1.264***     1.254***    1.267***    1.255*** 
 (0.326) (0.329) (0.321) (0.322) (0.317) (0.318) 
N 2760 2760 2760 2760 2760 2760 
R2 0.207 0.214 0.215 0.216 0.215 0.217 
adj. R2 0.121 0.128 0.129 0.130 0.129 0.131 
AIC 14748.538 14727.353 14726.134 14721.090 14724.826 14719.796 
 
Total effect in poor 
countries 
Total effect in hot 
countries                          
       
 
                
    
  -1.496***                  
(0.402) 
 
 
 -1.134**   
(0.511) 
-0.590  
(0.399)                                      
 
  -1.318***               
(0.454) 
-0.480    
(0.386)
 
 -1.292***              -1.444***                                   
(0.449)                (0.416) 
-0.966**                -0.854*                   
(0.468)                  (0.472) 
77 
 
Table A.22 
Including precipitation interactions 
 
 
 
Dependent variable: 
Annual TFP growth rate 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
∆Temp 
 
 -0.485** 
 
-0.031 
 
0.055 
 
0.096 
 
0.007 
 
0.050 
 (0.216) (0.136) (0.143) (0.123) (0.134) (0.120) 
 
Poor x ∆Temp     -1.506***  -1.199**     -1.335***  
  (0.404) (0.463)  (0.437) 
 
 
Hot x ∆Temp   -0.690 -0.618   
   (0.452) (0.429) 
 
  
Poor_2 x ∆Temp      -1.427***     -1.534*** 
    (0.413)  (0.410) 
 
Hot_2 x ∆Temp      -1.035** -0.958* 
     (0.483) (0.481) 
       
∆Pre -0.033 -0.025 -0.002 -0.012 -0.042 -0.047 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.045) (0.045) (0.036) (0.036) 
       
Poor x ∆Pre  -0.036 -0.030  -0.045  
  (0.046) (0.044)  (0.049)  
       
Hot x ∆Pre   -0.038 -0.030   
    (0.056)  (0.059)   
       
Poor _2 x ∆Pre             -0.027          -0.044 
    (0.050)  (0.052) 
       
Hot_2 x ∆Pre     0.029 0.033 
     (0.049) (0.049) 
       
_cons    1.416***     1.333***     1.269***     1.262***     1.281***     1.272*** 
 (0.327) (0.331) (0.323) (0.324) (0.319) (0.320) 
N 2760 2760 2760 2760 2760 2760 
R2 0.208 0.215 0.216 0.217 0.216 0.218 
adj. R2 0.121 0.128 0.129 0.130 0.129 0.131 
AIC 14749.211 14728.774 14724.777 14719.715 14723.171 14717.971 
Total temperature effect 
in poor countries 
 
Total temperature effect 
in hot countries 
 
 
 
 -1.537***                  
(0.405) 
 
-1.144**   
(0.509) 
 
-0.636    
(0.402) 
 -1.331***                  
(0.450) 
 
-0.523            
(0.387) 
     -1.328***                -1.484***                                                                 
    (0.453)                   (0.419) 
 
-1.028**                  -0.908*                               
(0.473)                   (0.480)            
 
Total precipitation effect 
in poor countries 
 
Total precipitation effect 
in hot countries 
 
 
 
 
-0.061                  
(0.040) 
 
-0.032     
(0.056) 
 
-0.040    
(0.029) 
-0.039               
(0.066) 
 
-0.042            
(0.031) 
-0.087*                   -0.091*                                          
(0.047)                  (0.052) 
 
-0.013                    -0.014                    
(0.040)                   (0.040) 
 
Notes: 
All specifications include country FE and Region x Time FE. Poor is a dummy with value 1 for countries with below median GDP per 
capita in 1960. Hot is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median average temperature in the 1960s. Poor_2 is a dummy with 
value 1 for countries with below median GDP per capita. Hot_2 is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median average 
temperature. Temperature change is annual and expressed in degree Celsius. Precipitation change is annual and expressed is in units of 
100 mm per year. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the country level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
78 
 
Table A.23 
Using temperature and precipitation levels 
 
 
 
Dependent 
variable: 
Annual TFP 
growth rate 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
Temp 
 
-0.254 
 
0.284 
 
0.270 
 
 0.286* 
 
 0.283* 
 
  0.304** 
 (0.212) (0.171) (0.169) (0.147) (0.166) (0.147) 
       
Pre 0.015 -0.004 -0.003 -0.005 -0.004 -0.006 
 (0.046) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.044) (0.044) 
       
Poor x Temp    -1.529***   -1.570***    -1.534***  
  (0.377) (0.438)  (0.379)  
       
Hot x Temp   0.081 0.108   
   (0.402) (0.385)   
       
Poor_2 x Temp      -1.686***    -1.644*** 
    (0.419)  (0.371) 
       
Hot_2 x Temp     0.030 0.062 
     (0.648) (0.650) 
       
_cons 5.638     13.008***     12.741***     13.485***    12.880**    13.577** 
 (3.691) (4.271) (4.533) (4.597) (5.648) (5.676) 
N 2760 2760 2760 2760 2760 2760 
R2 0.205 0.211 0.211 0.212 0.211 0.212 
adj. R2 0.118 0.125 0.124 0.125 0.124 0.125 
AIC 14757.567 14738.273 14740.227 14737.313 14740.269 14737.379 
 
Total effect in poor 
countries 
Total effect in hot 
countries                          
 
       
 
                
    
 
-1.245***   
(0.359) 
  
 
 -1.300***               
(0.440) 
  0.351    
(0.406)                                      
                                                                                               
-1.399***            -1.251***             -1.339***                                               
(0.421)               (0.349)                (0.351) 
 0.395                  0.313                   0.367             
(0.390)          (0.694)                (0.692)   
Notes: 
All specifications include country FE and Region x Time FE.                                                                                                                               
Poor is a dummy with value 1 for countries with below median GDP per capita in 1960.                                                                                                                                           
Hot is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median average temperature in the 1960s.                                                                      
Poor_2 is a dummy with value 1 for countries with below median GDP per capita.                                                                                                        
Hot_2 is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median average temperature.                                                                                                                                           
Temperature is annual and expressed in degree Celsius. 
Precipitation is annual and expressed is in units of 100 mm per year. 
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the country level.                                                                                                                     
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table A.24 
Relationship between annual labour productivity growth rates 
and temperature changes – Sample B 
 
Dependent variable: 
annual labour 
productivity 
growth rate 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
∆Temp 
 
-0.382* 
 
0.115 
 
0.106 
 
0.064 
 
0.104 
 
0.076 
 (0.215) (0.133) (0.134) (0.135) (0.131) (0.136) 
       
∆Pre -0.042*  -0.053**   -0.053***   -0.055***  -0.052**  -0.055** 
 (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) 
       
Poor x ∆Temp    -1.498***   -1.519***    -1.499***  
  (0.377) (0.409)  (0.377)  
       
Hot x ∆Temp   0.064 0.195   
   (0.429) (0.417)   
       
Poor_2 x ∆Temp      -1.655***    -1.588*** 
    (0.403)  (0.380) 
       
Hot_2 x ∆Temp     0.117 0.173 
     (0.398) (0.398) 
 
_cons 
 
     2.512*** 
    
    2.428*** 
    
    2.431*** 
   
   2.434*** 
   
    2.430*** 
   
    2.427*** 
    (0.480) (0.475) (0.475) (0.477) (0.474) (0.476) 
N 2448 2448 2448 2448 2448 2448 
R2 0.181 0.186 0.186 0.187 0.186 0.187 
adj. R2 0.103 0.109 0.109 0.109 0.109 0.109 
AIC 14034.284 14018.674 14020.654 14018.717 14020.617 14018.779 
 
Total effect in 
poor countries 
Total effect in 
hot countries                          
 
       
 
                
     
-1.383***            
(0.399) 
  
 
-1.413***                                         
(0.444) 
  0.169   
(0.414)                                      
                                                                                                                       
-1.591*** -1.396***            -1.512***                                              
(0.425)               (0.408)              (0.407) 
 0.259                  0.221                0.249                                                   
(0.415)          (0.403)             (0.406)   
Notes: 
All specifications include country FE and Region x Time FE.                                                                                                                                     
Poor is a dummy with value 1 for countries with below median GDP per capita in 1970.                                                                                                                                           
Hot is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median average temperature in the 1970s.                                                                                         
Poor_2 is a dummy with value 1 for countries with below median GDP per capita.                                                                                                                
Hot_2 is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median average temperature.                                                                                                                                           
Temperature change is annual and expressed in degree Celsius. 
Precipitation change is annual and expressed is in units of 100 mm per year. 
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the country level.                                                                                                                               
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Figure A.1 
TFP growth rates and temperature shocks in poor countries 
 
 
 
 
81 
 
(4)   List of countries in the sample, with TFP and GDP statistics 
 
Main Dataset: 
 
 TFP growth GDP level (ln) 
Country Mean sd Min Max Mean sd Min Max 
Argentina 0.143 4.680 -9.306 8.706 8.903 0.127 8.604 9.116 
Australia 0.881 1.706 -2.995 4.959 9.610 0.286 9.066 10.090 
Austria 0.753 1.576 -2.950 5.077 9.511 0.370 8.782 10.060 
Belgium 1.034 1.578 -2.386 5.653 9.548 0.336 8.847 10.037 
Bolivia -0.344 4.187 -18.923 7.048 7.725 0.146 7.380 7.923 
Brazil 0.332 3.723 -10.798 7.864 8.346 0.301 7.756 8.698 
Cameroon -0.220 5.256 -14.222 14.379 6.993 0.181 6.720 7.428 
Canada 0.144 1.426 -2.703 2.971 9.672 0.292 9.077 10.125 
Chile -0.235 5.061 -16.443 7.739 8.750 0.336 8.359 9.445 
China 1.947 5.321 -22.159 9.474 7.286 0.704 6.310 8.707 
Colombia 0.103 2.277 -6.856 4.321 8.317 0.277 7.823 8.755 
Costa Rica 0.160 2.526 -6.846 4.481 8.417 0.255 7.907 8.911 
Côte d'Ivoire 0.302 5.295 -17.380 12.646 7.343 0.172 7.072 7.621 
Denmark 0.879 1.465 -2.249 3.911 9.678 0.285 9.084 10.117 
Dominican Republic 0.188 4.640 -14.033 13.768 7.741 0.357 7.116 8.404 
Ecuador 0.676 4.022 -9.641 18.236 8.128 0.272 7.614 8.459 
Egypt 0.296 3.709 -7.219 14.296 7.593 0.412 6.899 8.208 
Finland 1.493 1.676 -3.426 6.124 9.465 0.366 8.737 10.062 
France 0.827 1.502 -3.526 4.032 9.578 0.304 8.909 9.992 
Germany 0.529 1.744 -2.659 4.598 9.528 0.280 8.950 9.906 
Greece 1.283 3.827 -9.292 10.393 9.011 0.404 8.054 9.642 
Guatemala 0.286 2.161 -7.019 6.512 8.100 0.184 7.693 8.359 
India 1.039 3.082 -8.976 8.295 7.049 0.365 6.624 7.868 
Indonesia 0.534 3.898 -18.429 6.239 7.576 0.469 6.839 8.283 
Iran -2.201 10.281 -56.055 10.182 8.295 0.274 7.676 8.809 
Ireland 1.079 2.343 -2.746 5.957 9.180 0.523 8.362 10.126 
Israel 0.552 3.012 -7.166 7.707 9.286 0.375 8.447 9.781 
Italy 0.892 2.255 -4.725 7.883 9.431 0.374 8.604 9.885 
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Jamaica -0.556 3.595 -8.062 9.391 8.148 0.115 7.884 8.326 
Japan 1.080 2.308 -5.021 5.810 9.468 0.487 8.291 9.996 
Jordan -1.403 6.403 -19.727 10.892 8.189 0.253 7.754 8.546 
Kenya -0.175 3.009 -9.876 7.715 8.868 0.131 6.531 7.018 
Korea, Republic of 1.343 2.774 -6.938 6.749 8.535 0.886 7.112 9.859 
Malaysia 0.840 3.410 -9.784 14.051 8.256 0.575 7.333 9.125 
Mexico -0.275 2.779 -6.982 8.017 8.600 0.257 8.057 8.962 
Morocco 0.891 5.547 -10.512 17.252 7.673 0.287 7.192 8.180 
Mozambique 1.441 4.916 -14.963 10.120 7.213 0.217 6.824 7.691 
Netherlands 0.762 1.350 -1.617 4.075 9.607 0.300 9.012 10.080 
New Zealand 0.231 2.606 -8.848 6.158 9.489 0.180 9.155 9.848 
Niger -0.512 6.161 -21.438 9.583 6.454 0.252 6.084 6.841 
Norway 1.005 1.447 -2.046 3.102 9.629 0.408 8.882 10.237 
Peru -0.427 5.250 -18.072 11.604 8.224 0.113 7.991 8.433 
Philippines -0.568 3.232 -11.502 3.615 7.631 0.157 7.297 7.904 
Portugal 0.847 3.234 -9.848 10.254 8.979 0.466 7.992 9.571 
Romania 2.407 5.147 -13.846 11.791 8.093 0.228 7.520 8.389 
Senegal 0.562 4.200 -8.226 12.816 7.205 0.073 7.078 7.321 
Spain 0.630 2.285 -2.354 8.880 9.121 0.463 8.030 9.773 
Sri Lanka 1.771 2.928 -2.788 8.528 7.648 0.384 7.158 8.389 
Sweden 0.950 1.492 -3.155 3.757 9.629 0.260 9.070 10.111 
Switzerland 0.293 1.564 -6.164 3.093 9.829 0.170 9.430 10.097 
Thailand 1.609 4.402 -7.162 24.662 8.026 0.651 6.983 9.040 
Trinidad and Tobago 0.630 4.590 -14.134 10.576 9.187 0.262 8.740 9.896 
Tunisia 1.110 4.487 -6.540 22.877 7.947 0.401 7.203 8.634 
Turkey 0.274 3.792  -12.144     7.919 8.369 0.354 7.706 8.978 
United Kingdom 0.922 1.693 -3.376 5.164 9.555 0.299 9.065 10.098 
United Republic  
of Tanzania 
0.646 3.421 -7.411 14.881 6.318 0.091 6.089 6.534 
United States 0.853 1.409 -3.488 3.218 9.883 0.292 9.335 10.353 
Uruguay -0.510 3.922 -11.420 6.048 8.733 0.205 8.460 9.101 
Venezuela -0.341 4.966 -10.120 15.371 9.138 0.104 8.853 9.328 
Zimbabwe -0.807 7.350 -15.199 26.759 7.088 0.169 6.718 7.267 
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Countries added in Sample B 
 
Bulgaria 0.443 5.514 -24.629 8.210 8.660 0.132 8.440 8.996 
Hungary 0.905 2.598 -9.900 3.820 8.756 0.128 8.523 9.073 
Kuwait -4.563 16.777 -57.824 37.095 9.382 0.429 8.719 10.449 
Panama -0.003 3.635 -8.713 9.736 8.510 0.130 8.246 8.716 
Paraguay -1.114 3.125 -9.224 3.312 7.965 0.178 7.535 8.159 
Poland 1.380 4.292 -12.977 5.280 8.691 0.172 8.396 9.112 
Qatar -0.253 6.348 -16.171 19.897 9.527 0.647 8.837 10.667 
Saudi Arabia -1.298 7.649 -20.307 15.124 9.192 0.168 8.939 9.505 
 
 
(5)    List of regions 
 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
Latin America and the Caribbean 
Middle East and North Africa 
South and East Asia and the Pacific 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Western Europe and offshoots 
 
